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ABSTRACT
THE (NOT SO) NEW NORMAL: A QUEER CRITIQUE OF LGBT
CHARACTERS AND THEMES IN PRIMETIME NETWORK
TELEVISION SITUATIONAL COMEDIES
by Robert Dallas Byrd Jr.
December 2014
This analysis of primetime situational comedies feature LGBTQ characters argues
that through heteronormative and homonormative constructions of sexuality, race,
gender, and class, many LGBTQ people are rendered invisible in the mainstream.
Through discourse analysis, the study describes how these programs work to normalize
gay and lesbian identity, which then resembles the dominant heterosexuality, aiding in
the advancement of white, middle class gays, who privatize sexuality and mimic
dominant conventions of gender, race, sexuality, and class in the public sphere. This
research is important in understanding the American public’s most recent shifts in public
opinion on issues of marriage equality and moral acceptance, but also in understanding
what groups of LGBTQ people may be excluded from the visible gay community.
Further, it is important to examine the underlying ideology of these programs to extract
meanings that have the potential to further subvert queer notions of sex and sexual
politics, race, gender and class, which only work to advance the marginalization of those
who do not fit the dominant mold.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The 2012 election cycle marked the first time an American electorate voted in
favor of ballot initiatives that legalized same-sex marriage, and it also marked the first
time a majority of state voters, in any of the 50 states, opposed a state marriage
amendment that defined marriage as a legal contract between one man and one woman.
Three states, Maine, Maryland, and Washington, voted to legalize same-sex marriage.
They joined six other states where same-sex marriage was already legal. The same-sex
marriage campaign also received a boost from the United States Supreme Court on June
26, 2013. The Court, in a 5-4 decision struck down part of the 1996 Defense of Marriage
Act, which prohibited federal recognition of same-sex marriages performed in some
states (Savage, 2013). The Court also dismissed an appeal on behalf of proponents of
California’s Proposition 8, an amendment that halted same-sex marriage in California in
2008. As a result, same-sex marriages resumed in the state a few weeks later. Nine other
states legalized either same-sex marriages or civil unions in 2013: Minnesota, Delaware,
Colorado, Illinois, Rhode Island, New Jersey, New Mexico, and Hawaii. In 2014, Oregon
became the nineteenth state to legalize same-sex marriage. Since the 2012 election, 16
judges in 12 states have ruled against same-sex marriage ban laws, and lawsuits
challenging ban laws have been filed in all 50 states.
The changes in laws in several states are highlighted by national trends that tend
to show a growing support for lesbian and gay persons. In 2011, for the first time since
Gallup began polling the public on lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgendered (LGBT)
rights issues, the majority of Americans supported marriage equality (Jones, 2011). Since
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2010, a majority of Americans also consider “gay or lesbian relations morally
acceptable” (Saad, 2012 para. 1). The answers to a July 2013 Gallup Poll on Gay and
Lesbian Rights showed that 54% of Americans now think that same-sex marriage should
be legal, up from 40% in May of 2008 and 27% in 1996, the first year the poll question
was asked (Jones, 2013). Election results and polling numbers represent a shift in
American culture, but what factors have contributed to this shift in culture and what does
this shift mean from the approximately 3.4% (Gates & Newport, 2012) of Americans
who identify as LGBTQ?
Streitmatter (2009) argues that the American attitude toward gays and lesbians
has evolved from fear and intolerance during the 1950s when words like pervert and
deviates were used to describe gay men to a current era of acceptance. Streitmatter (2009)
argued in his book From ‘Perverts’ to ‘Fab Five’: The Media’s Changing Depiction of
Gay Men and Lesbians, “The media have not merely reflected the American public’s
shift to a more enlightened view of gay people, but they have been instrumental in
propelling that change” (p. 2). He along with others in the mass communication industry
and in American politics have argued that the American media, particularly television,
have played a major role in shaping attitudes about the LGBT community.
However, media critic Dow (2001) argues, “Popular culture can be political, in
the sense that it can empower certain constituencies and can energize political agendas.
However, one of popular culture’s most salient characteristics is that it is ephemeral—its
dependence on the power of personality, hot topics, and quickly shifting tastes makes it a
fragile basis for lasting social change” (p. 137). It is impossible to draw a direct causal
link between shifting perceptions of gay people and changing media representations, but
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it is possible to examine the discourse of television sitcoms to discuss the representations
and ideologies being espoused in such programs. Early television studies scholar Fiske
(1987) argued that social change can occur and that television can be a part of that
change, but he said, “it is wrong to see it as an originator of social change, or even to
claim that it ought to be so, for social change must have its root in material social
existence; but television can be, must be, part of that change, and its effectivity will either
hasten or delay it” (p. 45).
Despite positive change in the representation of LGBTQ people, scholars argue
that problematic narratives still exists in media representations (Avila-Saavedra, 2009;
Battles & Hilton-Morrow, 2002; Dow, 2001; Duggan, 2003; Linneman, 2008; Manuel,
2009; Mitchell, 2005; Papacharissi & Fernback, 2008; Shugart, 2003; Westerfelhaus &
Lacroix, 2006; Yep & Elia, 2012). Television narratives often exclude lesbians,
transgender men and women, bisexuals, and gay men and lesbians of color, and fictional
narratives of gay white men often rely on stereotypes of affluent couples with copious
amounts of expendable income, overly effeminate caricatures, or sad and lonely gay men.
Television programming and film from the last 10 years, like Will & Grace, Queer Eye
for the Straight Guy, Brokeback Mountain, and The L Word, have been studied for their
groundbreaking material and timing, but they have also been criticized for adhering to old
problematic narratives, which often restrict queer people to heteronormative
constructions of sexuality and gender (Avila-Saavedra, 2009; Battles & Hilton-Morrow,
2002; Dow, 2001; Gross, 2001; Streitmatter, 2009; Westerfelhous & Lacrois, 2006).
Building on previous research, the purpose of this dissertation is to analyze the
discourse of LGBTQ issues in network television sitcoms. This research is important in
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understanding the American public’s most recent shifts in public opinion on issues of
marriage equality and moral acceptance, but also in understanding what groups of
LGBTQ people may be excluded from the visible gay community. I argue these programs
work to normalize gay and lesbian identity, which then resembles the dominant
heterosexuality, aiding in the advancement of white, middle class gays, who privatize
sexuality and mimic dominant conventions of gender, race, sexuality, and class in the
public sphere. Further, it is important to examine the underlying ideology of these
programs to extract meanings that have the potential to further subvert queer notions of
sex and sexual politics, race, gender and class, which only work to marginalize those who
do not fit the dominant mold.
I conducted a discourse analysis via reading theory of the five shows nominated
for the 2013 Gay and Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation (GLAAD) award for
outstanding comedy series. The five nominees include: Glee (Fox), Go On (NBC), Happy
Endings (ABC), Modern Family (ABC), and The New Normal (NBC). According to a
GLAAD press release (2013), the media awards were designed to “recognize and honor
media for their fair, accurate, and inclusive representations of the lesbian, gay, bisexual,
and transgendered community and the issues that affect their lives” (GLAAD.org, 2013
para. 10). The same release boasts that the three awards ceremonies, which are sponsored
by major corporate donors like Absolut vodka, held in New York, Los Angeles, and San
Francisco “bring together more than 5,000 supporters to raise nearly $3.5 million for the
organization’s work” (GLAAD.org, 2013 para. 11). During the awards ceremony in Los
Angeles on April 20, 2013, NBC’s The New Normal was given the award for best
comedy—Modern Family and Glee are both past award recipients in the same category.
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NBC launched The New Normal for the 2012-2013 season, the show which is
loosely based on the life of the shows creator/executive producer Ryan Murphy, who also
is co-creator and producer of other past and current television series with either gay and
lesbian themes or character like Popular (1999-2001), Nip/Tuck (2003-2010), Glee
(2009-2013), and American Horror Story (2011-2013). The show features a gay couple
Bryan, played by Broadway and television actor Andrew Rannels, and David, played by
film and television actor Justin Bartha, who live in Los Angeles. Bryan, a television
producer, and David, a doctor, hire a surrogate to have the couple’s first child. Bryan and
David hire Goldie, played by Georgia King, who has just moved to California from Ohio
with her eight-year-old daughter and narrow-minded mother, played by Ellen Barkin.
NBC promotes the show on its site saying, “Goldie quickly becomes the guys’ surrogate
and quite possibly the girl of their dreams. Surrogate mother, surrogate family”
(nbc.com/the-new-normal, 2012 “About the show”). The show had minimal ratings
success, with the second largest audience, 6.88 million, viewing the show’s pilot episode
on September 10, 2012. The ratings climbed to 6.96 million viewers for the second week
but dropped to just a little over two million by week 19. NBC announced in early May
2013 that the show would not be back for the 2013-2014 season (Goldberg, 2013). The
New Normal suffered the same fate as NBC’s other nominated show, Go On, which
featured Friends star Matthew Perry. Perry played Ryan King, a sports talk radio
personality trying to move on after the death of his wife. The show centers around the
members of a group therapy program, of which one is a lesbian attorney named Anne,
who recently lost her partner. A preview of the show aired during the 2012 Olympics,
which garnered more than 16 million viewers; however, the ratings dropped to 9.73
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million by the second episode and to less than three million by episode 19, similar to The
New Normal.
A third show studied was also cancelled at the end of the 2012-2013 television
season. ABC’s Happy Endings, which was in its third season, was dropped by the
network because of a decrease in the ratings. The season premiere aired with an audience
of 5.57 million viewers on October 23, 2012, and the series finale aired on May 3, 2013,
with an audience of 2.17 million viewers. The show, which first began airing in midseason of 2011, is set in Chicago and is centered on six best friends: the married couple
Brad (Damon Wayans Jr.) and Jane (Elize Coupe), Alex (Elisha Cuthbert), Dave
(Zachary Knighton), Penny (Casey Wilson), and their gay friend Max (Adam Pally). The
show begins, in season one, with the breakup of Alex and Dave and the change of the
group dynamic that followed. As the series progressed, the troubled group dynamic is
abandoned, and the show begins to take on more of Friends storyline—the stories of the
six friends. The show’s gay character, Max, is billed by the show’s creator, David Caspe,
the show’s slovenly, uncultured, lazy, irresponsible, unemployed, non-stereotypical gay
man. He was even described by one of the other characters as a “straight guy who likes
dudes” (McDonald, 2011 para. 3). This is the second season Happy Endings has been
nominated by GLAAD for Outstanding Comedy Series; the first was in 2012 during the
show’s second season.
Two of the nominated shows, Fox’s Glee and ABC’s Modern Family, were both
in their fourth seasons during the 2012-2013 television season, and both series have been
nominated for multiple awards. The awards count for Glee includes six Emmy Awards,
four Golden Globes, and six Teen Choice Awards. GLAAD has nominated the show for
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its Outstanding Comedy Series in each of the four seasons that the show has aired—and it
won twice (2010 and 2011) (IMDB Awards for Glee, 2013). Likewise, Modern Family
has received one Golden Globe Award and 18 Emmy Awards. The show has also been
nominated in each of its four seasons by GLAAD for Outstanding Comedy Series and,
also, has won twice, 2011 and 2012 (Internet Movie Database, 2013).
Glee is an hour-long musical comedy program that centers on the McKinley High
School Glee Club and its director. According to the show’s website, Glee is about
“talented kids who escape the harsh realities of high school by joining a glee club, where
they find strength, acceptance and, ultimately, their voice” (Glee About the Show, 2013
para. 1). The site also boasts the show’s role in American culture and its place in
television history claiming, “Since its debut, GLEE has become a bona fide cultural
phenomenon, received prestigious honors, including a Golden Globe Award and a
Peabody Award, and singlehandedly made glee clubs cool again. The series boasts
critical acclaim, a die-hard fan base, two Grammy Award nominations, two platinum and
five gold albums, more than 43 million songs and more than 13 million albums sold
worldwide, two sold-out concert tours, a 3-D movie and four Emmy Awards and three
Golden Globes, including the award for Best Television Series—Comedy or Musical”
(Glee About the Show, 2013 para. 3). The show has also become known for its gay and
lesbian characters. In the first season, Kurt (Chris Colfer) came out as gay to the other
students in glee club and his hyper-masculine, auto mechanic father. Since then a
multitude of both regular and reoccurring gay and lesbian characters have been written
into the show, including a lesbian cheerleader, Santana (Naya Rivera), and her bisexual
girlfriend, Brittany (Heather Morris), who also happens to be a cheerleader. In season
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two, Blaine (Darren Criss) is introduced to the show and later becomes Kurt’s boyfriend.
The third season marked a first for the show, the introduction of a transgender character,
Unique (Alex Newell). Unique becomes a regular cast member during the fourth season.
Modern Family focuses on the story of Jay Pritchett (Ed O’Neill), his daughter
Claire Dunphy (Julie Bowen) and his son Mitchell Pritchett (Jesse Tyler Ferguson). The
storyline of the show centers on the dynamic of the Pritchett and Dunphy families, which
include the gay coupling of Mitchell and his partner Cameron Tucker (Eric Stonestreet),
who have adopted their daughter Lily (Aubrey Anderson-Emmons) from Vietnam.
Mitchell’s character bio on the show’s website describes Mitchell and Cam as opposites
who balance each other (Mitchell Pritchett, 2013). The Modern Family website bills the
show as an “honest and often hilarious look into the sometimes warm, sometimes twisted,
embrace of the modern family” (Modern Family About the Show, 2013 para. 2).
Discourse Analysis and Television Studies
Often discourse is identified as merely a conversation that is being had about a
particular topic; however, discourse is far more complicated and far more attached to the
dominant ideology than a mere conversation about a given topic. For the purposes of this
study, discourse analysis is in reference to a web of meanings and understandings—a
notion that has roots in the work of Foucault (1978). He does not limit discourse to a
discussion between two people or a particular public discussion had by many. He
contends discourse is a discussion in a particular context with various power relations at
play. It is not only who was speaking but also how they spoke, what they said, what they
did not say, the reaction to what they said, and who decided what could be said. Foucault,
who argues, “knowledge is power,” saw language as a tool for the powerful to maintain
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power by not only restricting speech on certain topics but also prescribing which
language was more appropriate for the topic and for whom it was appropriate to speak in
the first place.
Acosta-Alzuru and Lester-Roushanzamir (2000) define discourse as “a system of
representation in which shared meanings are produced and exchanged . . . Discourse
emphasizes relations of power while also attending to relations of meanings and the
process of production and exchange are therefore ‘materialized’ within the text” (p. 307).
Similarly, Fiske (1987) argues that discourse “is a language or system of representation
that has developed socially in order to make and circulate a coherent set of meanings
about an important topic area. These meanings serve the interests of that section of
society within which the discourse originates and which works ideologically to naturalize
those meanings into common sense” (p. 14). He also contends that discourse is a social
act, which may support or transgress the dominant ideology. So then discourses function
not only to read a text (like a television program) but also, in the grand scheme, to make
sense out of social experiences.
Considering discourse is not simply a conversation but a discussion with a system
of underlying meanings and social interactions, the analysis of discourses must then take
that system of meaning into consideration. Discourse analysis scholars have debated the
merits of text-based analysis for years. One of the early scholars, Fairclough (1992),
argues that discourse analysis must include a detailed textual analysis that consists of
both a linguistic analysis and an intertexual analysis. The linguistic analysis examines the
words used up to the formation of sentences and dialogue while the intertextual analysis
shows how the text is selected based on “conventionalized practices, which are available
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to text producers and interpreters in particular social circumstances” (p. 194). Other
scholars (Fiske, 1987; Philo, 2007; Fürsich, 2009; Gray & Lotz, 2012; Molina, 2009;
Newcomb & Hirsch, 1983) argue that a strict textual analysis alone, without regard for
context, audience, history, and producers, is not sufficient for understanding how a text
interacts and informs the culture. This has been particularly true in the field of television
studies at least since the 1960s and 1970s.
Television Studies
The early history of television analysis, which evolved into television studies,
began in the social science tradition of positivist research. According to Gray and Lotz
(2012), effects-based models were used to study television—like earlier studies of
newspaper and radio. These models reduced television to a series of negative effects on
society from degrading the arts to dumbing down society as a whole. The effects model
research often examined the medium without regard for context or audience reception.
Gray and Lotz also claim that before critical theories and methods became part of the
academic lexicon in the 1960s and 1970s, the humanities, literature, and film studies
denied television as a legitimate field of study because many saw television as the “vast
wasteland” as argued by former FCC chair Newton Minnow, not worthy of academic
study (Gray & Lotz, 2012). Gray and Lotz contend in the early days of television,
researchers saw the medium as a monoglot, only speaking one language, instead of
looking at the smaller pieces that make up the entire program (i.e., lighting, camera
angles, script, editing, etc.).
With the rise of cultural and critical approaches, Gray and Lotz (2012) argue
television programs were then “open for analysis” and “because of their popular status,

	
  

11
some critics regarded them as especially rich for study” (p. 12). Television critics began
to focus on the ideological groundings of televisual texts, and how those groundings
perpetuated a dominant ideology on a host of topics from race, class, gender, and politics
to sexuality.
Television as Polysemy
Newcomb and Hirsch (1983) argue that television has a “pleasant disguise of
fictional entertainment,” but that there is a “concern for the ‘dominant’ messages
embedded” in the text (p. 46). Fiske (1987) contends television is a cultural agent
“particularly as a provoker and circulator of meanings” (p. 1). Further Fiske (1987)
claims, “television broadcasts programs that are replete with potential meanings, and that
it attempts to control and focus this meaningfulness into a more singular preferred
meaning that performs the work of the dominant ideology” (p. 1). Fiske argues television
programs are fortified with codes, which he defined as “links between producers, text,
and audiences . . . through which texts interrelate in a network of meanings that
constitutes our cultural world” (p. 4). He writes, “What passes for reality in any culture is
the product of that culture’s codes, so ‘reality’ is always already encoded, it is never
‘raw’”(p. 5). In other words, commonsense can only be produced when “‘reality,’
representations, and ideology merge into a coherent, seemingly natural unity” (p. 6).
Fiske sees television and the characters on the screen as encodings of dominant ideology,
which means that for them to seem natural or realistic they must adhere to prescribed
notions of being. He maintains, “Characters on television are not just representations of
individual people but are encodings of ideology . . . the ideological codes are also
important, for it is these that make sense out of the relationship between the technical
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code of casting and the social code of appearance, and that also relate the televisual use to
their broader use in the culture at large” (p. 9). Fiske along with Newcomb and Hirsch
(1983) contend, however, that these messages are not monolithic and can be interpreted
differently by individuals in various social situations.
Newcomb and Hirsch (1983) argue that television, “In its role as central cultural
medium . . . presents a multiplicity of meanings rather than a monolithic dominant point
of view. It often focuses on our most prevalent concerns, our deepest dilemmas. Our most
traditional views, those that are repressive and reactionary, as well as those that are
subversive and emancipatory, are upheld, examined, maintained, and transformed. The
emphasis is on process rather than product, on discussion rather than indoctrination, on
contradiction and confusion rather than coherence” (p. 564). Similarly, Fiske (1987)
contends a discourse is not given meaning by a speaker or audience but by society. In
other words, the meanings invited by a text pre-exist the use in any one text itself at any
one time. A text, according to Fiske, refers to a television program that has been read by
an audience, who through interaction with the program has begun to activate “some of
the meanings/pleasure” that a particular program invites. He goes on to argue, “Texts are
the site of conflict between their forces of production and modes of reception . . . A
program is produced by the industry, a text by its readers” (p. 14).
Fiske, like Newcomb and Hirsch, claims television is polysemy, or having
multiple meanings. He claims, “A program provides a potential of meanings which may
be realized, or made into actually experienced meanings, by socially situated viewers in
the process of reading” (pp. 15-16). Because the viewer is situated socially, he or she
brings his or her own previous experiences, knowledge, viewing habits, history, etc., and
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each can possibly take away a unique reading of the text. However, Fiske maintains,
“This polysemic potential is neither boundless nor structureless: the text delineates the
terrain within which meanings may be made and proffers some meanings more
vigorously than others” (p. 16).
Textual Analysis
Close textual analysis of television texts has become the preferred method of
analysis for television studies scholars “to overcome the common limitations of
traditional quantitative content analysis such as limitation to manifest content in to
quantifiable categories,” according to Fürsich (2009). Fürsich argues, “Textual analysis
allows the researcher to discern latent meaning, but also implicit patterns, assumptions
and omissions of a text. Text is understood in its broader, poststructural, sense as any
cultural practice or object that can be ‘read’” (pp. 240-241). Fürsich’s argument for a
deeper, richer understanding through textual analysis has become the hallmark of
television studies scholars.
Fiske (1987) argues, “A textual study of television, then, involves three foci: the
formal qualities of television programs and their flow; the intertextual relations of
television within itself, with other media, and with conversation; and the study of socially
situated readers and the process of reading” (p. 16), and Gray and Lotz (2012) maintain a
textual analysis explores not only the aesthetics of a program but also examines the text’s
“relationship to dominant ideology—its impact on and place in the culture and power
networks that surround it” (p. 37). They argue that a researcher has to account for a
program’s audiences, producers, and history as well as its context and acknowledge that
each is “intricately interwoven with the others” (p. 22).
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The concept of intertexuality is key in the analysis of texts. Fiske (1987),
Fairclough (1992), and Gray and Lotz (2012) all argue that examining intertexuality is a
necessity of extracting meaning from a text. Intertexuality, according to Fiske, “pre-orient
the reader to exploit television’s polysemy by activating the text in certain ways, that is
by making some meanings rather than others. Studying a text’s intertextual relations can
provide us with valuable clues to the readings that a particular culture or subculture is
likely to produce from it” (p. 108). Genre is one form of intextuality that allows the
audience to draw certain meanings from a program before ever viewing—it’s funny,
thirty minutes, and the protagonist usually gets in and out of some sort of comedic
predicament. Holbert, Shah, and Kwak (2003) argue that different genres evoke different
feelings (positive or negative) toward political issues. Gray and Lotz (2012) also discuss
the concept of paratextuality, all outside material pertaining to the show like pre-press
promoting the show like the DVD bonus material, trailers, opening credits, or anything
else that falls outside the script of the show, but also influences how an audience reads
the show. Gray and Lotz (2012) contend that paratexts work as intertexts to co-create
meaning for a program both within the program and from without. This study includes
both a linguistic analysis, as prescribed by Fairclough and Fiske, grounded in queer
theory, but also a contextualized analysis that considers the historical contexts of LGBTQ
representations on network television sitcoms and the current political landscape.
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CHAPTER II
HISTORY OF QUEER TELEVISION
Avila-Saavedra (2009) argues that a queer perspective in media criticism must
reach beyond the numeric representations of gays and lesbians toward a broader
examination of the hegemonic notions of sexuality, gender, race, and class and how they
interact in everyday lives. He contends, “Queer media studies examine how the mass
media, as a cultural and social institution, contribute to the maintenance of the sexual
status quo expressed by the pre-eminence of heterosexuality in the representation of
social interactions” (p. 8). Queer theory is grounded in works of Foucault (1978),
Sedgwick (1990), and Butler (1990). Although none of them use the term queer theory,
their arguments about sex, sexuality, gender, and power have informed more than two
decades of scholarship. Foucault (1978) claims in his History of Sexuality that knowledge
of sexuality is power and that the absolute means of control over life and death comes
through controlling sexual practice—that is defining what is acceptable and what is not.
He argues that a society’s laws, in order to control life, then begin to operate “more and
more around the norm” (p. 144). Foucault claims we think of sexuality as part of our
identity—what makes us who we are—when, in fact, sexuality is a social construct that
makes us easier to control.
Likewise Butler (1990) argues in her seminal work Gender Trouble that sexuality
is “always constructed within the terms of discourse and power” and power is “partially”
understood in terms of “heterosexual and phallic cultural conventions” (p. 30). Butler
contends that heterosexual, homosexual, and bisexual practices are all understood and
presented through a “framework” that is ultimately an “asymmetrical binary of
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masculine/feminine” (p.31). In other words, “unity of gender is the effect of regulatory
practice that seeks to render gender identity uniform through a compulsory
heterosexuality” (p. 31). Queer theorists become more prevalent in the early 1990s as a
response to the shift in gay and lesbian rights movement tactics and philosophy.
Roots of Queer Theory
The early movement of homosexuals in the United States, now referred to as the
homophile movement, sought social assimilation (Seidman, 1993). Seidman argues that
many in the homophile movement saw homosexuality as symptomatic of a psychic
abnormality. However, he contends, “the underlying shared humanity of homosexuals
and heterosexuals was thought to warrant the elimination of discrimination” (p. 111). The
movement did not work to establish a homosexual culture that would separate it from the
mainstream in terms of an ethnic minority because the thrust of the movement was to
blend the homosexual minority in with the mainstream by eliminating discrimination.
After the Stonewall Riots of 1969, which are seen as the unofficial marker of the
beginning of the gay liberation movement, new political and academic thought began to
surface. The gay liberation movement first moved toward the destruction of a
“sex/gender system” that “locked them into mutually exclusive homo/hetero and
feminine/masculine roles” (Seidman, 1993 p. 110). Seidman (1993) claims early
liberationists theory operated under the assumption that human nature had “innate
polymorphous” and “androgynous” characteristics (p. 110). He argues that it resembled,
in the early years (the late 1960s and early 1970s), the postmodernist theory of sexuality,
but in the late 1970s it gave way to an “ethnic/minority sociopolitical agenda” (p. 110).
Where the liberationist model measures success by how much it upsets the established

	
  

17
system, according to Jagose (1996), the ethnic model, which established gays and
lesbians as a minority group, is measured by securing “citizenship rights for lesbian and
gay subjects” (p. 61).
Jagose (1996) states, “Ironically, given its origins in a race-based politics, the
ethnic model’s gay and lesbian subject was white” (p. 62). She argues that it was not just
that the majority of the gay and lesbian subjects were white, but that by identifying as a
gay or lesbian, a minority, often stripped subjects of other ethnic or racial identifiers.
Seidman maintains that at this time there is a push toward community building “around
the notion of a unitary lesbian and gay identity” (p. 116).
But the united front fractured over issues of gender and race. The gay liberation
broke into at least three main factions, with many smaller groups inside those factions.
The mainstream movement consisted of mostly white gay men with the lesbians and gay
men of color left contesting the notion of a unitary gay subject (Seidman, 1993). Jagose
(1996) claims that, “Lesbians and gays of color, frustrated by the assumption that they
would have more in common with white lesbians and gay men than with their own ethnic
or racial communities, began to critique both overt and covert racism in the mainstream
gay community” (p. 63). According to Herkt (1995), “the gay identity is observably a
philosophically conservative construct, based upon premises that no longer have any
persuasive academic relationship to contemporary theories of identity or gender” (p. 45).
Although the ethnic model did claim some social change, as Seidman (1993)
argues, “it reinforces broadly mainstream social norms that devalue desires, behaviors,
and social bonds that involve attraction to both sexes” (p. 123). Moreover, Seidman
argues that the unitary gay identity also reinforced the dominant binaries of hetero/homo.
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He says, “If homosexuality and heterosexuality are a coupling in which each presupposes
the other, each being present in the invocation of the other, and in which this coupling
assumes hierarchical forms, then the epistemic and political project of identifying a gay
subject reinforces and reproduces this hierarchical figure” (p. 130). In other words, the
gay identity not only reinforces the heteronormative but also gives preference to the
heterosexist notions of gender, sexual desire, and sexuality.
Jagose (1996) claims that the distinction between the ethnic minority wing of the
liberationist movement and the queer movement, which followed, centered on the
structuralist notion of a gay identity versus a post-structuralist theory of identification.
According to Jagose, the lesbian and gay movements were committed to the idea of an
“identity politics in assuming identity as the necessary prerequisite for effective political
intervention” (p. 77). Identity is then provided in terms of categories of sexuality (e.g.,
gay/straight), whereas the post-structuralist notion of identity used in queer theory is
“provisional and contingent” (p. 78). Those provisional and contingent concepts of
identity make queer difficult to define, but its ambiguity, according to Jagose, is “often
cited as the reason for its mobilization” (p. 97). Jagose argues that queer can describe a
“wide range of impulses and cultural expressions, including space for describing and
expressing bisexual, transsexual, and straight queerness” (p. 97). In the mainstream gay
and lesbian movement, identity is not built on sexuality but on an ethnic minority model
that seeks to normalize gay and lesbian relations to further gay and lesbian civil rights.
Being Normal
This process of normalization is problematic, according to Warner (1999) because
it intends to define identity not on the basis of sex but on a sexual identity. By eliminating
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a politics of sex, Warner argues, a hierarchy is created, which sorts “people by greater or
lesser degrees of privilege” (p. 40). Furthermore, he claims, “Some people pay a higher
price for the loathing of queer sexuality (or gender variance) than others. In the right
social quarter, if you behave yourself, you can have a decent life as a normal homo—at
least, up to a point. Those with the biggest fig leaves stand, always, at the top of the
hierarchy” (p. 40). Warner claims members of the movement have never been able to
resolve the sense that sex and dignity, which is often defined by no sex, are incompatible.
He says at this moment in the movement those are the folks who are winning. Warner
argues that like most stigmatized groups, gays and lesbians have devised a course to
overcome stigma. The course he argues “was to win acceptance by the dominant culture,
rather than to change the self-understanding of that culture” (p. 50).
Warner (1999) argues people did not really care about what normal was or being
normal until the nineteenth century and the advent of statistical information that
“surrounded” people with numbers “that tell them what normal is” (p. 53). He claims
things like census figures, market demographics, opinion polls, social science studies,
psychological surveys, clinical tests, sales figures, trends, etc. all perpetuated the
obsession with normal. He claims, “Under the conditions of mass culture, they [people]
are constantly bombarded by images of statistical populations and their norms,
continually invited to make an implicit comparison between themselves and the mass of
other bodies” (pp. 53-54). Thus, the normal is idealized and sought by people—especially
those stigmatized by society.
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The (Hetero) Normal
Warner argues that the model for normal then becomes the proffered heterosexual
model—for which all other relationships or sexualities are judged in society. Berlant and
Warner (1998) said:
Heteronormativity is more than ideology, or prejudice, or phobia against gays and
lesbians; it is produced in almost every aspect of the forms and arrangements of
social life: nationality, the state, and the law; commerce; medicine; and education;
as well as in the conventions and effects of narrativity, romance, and other
protected spaces of culture. It is hard to see these fields as heteronormative
because the sexual culture straight people inhabit is so diffuse, a mix of languages
they are just developing with premodern notions of sexuality so ancient that their
material conditions feel hardwired into personhood. (p. 554-555)
They argue that heteronormativity is a fundamental “motor of social organization in the
United States” (p. 564). So that heteronormative forms of intimacy are supported in the
marriage and family law, in the domestic sphere of the home, in work, and in politics.
They contend that queer people are sometimes able to invent versions of heterosexual
institutions, but they do so by “betrothing” the “couple form and its language of personal
significance,” which does nothing to transform the “material and ideological conditions
that divide intimacy from history, politics, and publics” (p. 562).
Duggan (2003) argues that the process of normalization is not only a product of
heteronormative, dominant ideology but also a product of the neoliberal, assimilationist
politics of the gay and lesbian movement that began in the 1990s. She contends that on
the surface, an era of greater acceptance of gays and lesbians appeared to be on the rise.
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However, she claims, acceptance was mostly aimed at “assimilated, gender-appropriate,
politically mainstream portions of the gay population” (p. 44). She claims that this shift
was noticeable in politics, the work place, and media representations. She also contended
that the neoliberal “equality machine” adopted tactics that no longer represented a broadbased progressive movement but had become “the lobbying, legal, and public relations
firms for an increasingly narrow gay, moneyed elite” (p. 45). Consequently, she argues,
the fight for same sex marriage and openly gay military service has replaced “the array of
political, cultural, and economic issues that galvanized the national groups as they first
emerged” (p. 45).
Duggan (2003) terms the neoliberal sexual politics the “new homonormativity,”
which she claims, “is a politics that does not contest dominant heteronormative
assumptions and institutions, but upholds and sustains them, while promising the
possibility of a demobilized gay constituency and a privatized, depoliticized gay culture
anchored in domesticity and consumption” (p. 50). She notes homonormativity is not
parallel with Warner’s term heteronormativity because it in no way mimics the
“institutions promoting and sustaining heterosexual coupling” (p. 94), but that it does
work to bring “the desired public into political salience as a perceived mainstream,
primarily through a rhetorical remapping of public/private boundaries designed to shrink
gay public spheres, and redefine gay equality against the ‘civil rights agenda’ and
‘liberationism,’ as access to the institutions of domestic privacy, the ‘free’ market, and
patriotism” (p. 51). She argues then that there is a rhetorical recoding of the LGBTQ
movement where civil rights becomes defined by a few conservatizing institutions
(marriage, military service, parenthood), and the right to privacy becomes “domestic
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confinement.” All of this adds up to “corporate culture managed by a minimal state,
achieved by the neoliberal privatization of affective as well as economic public life” (pp.
65-66). Ward and Schneider (2009) claim attention must be given to how normative
sexual practices can take hold even within feminist, socialist, and gay and lesbian
movements. They claim that particular attention must be given to heteronormativity’s
“companion,” homonormativity, “or the pursuit of lesbian and gay rights traditionally
granted to white, middle-class heterosexuals, such as privacy, domesticity, and
consumption” (p. 435).
LGBTQ Representations on Television
Scholars often argue that there is a history of heteronormative and
homonormative LGBTQ representations in television programs. Media scholar Dow
(2001) argues that representations of same-sex attraction have existed since the beginning
of television. She points to a drag queen routine performed by Milton Berle on the Milton
Berle Show. She also maintains “there were powerful gay undertones in the comic
relationships of Jack Benny” on his show (p. 129) and the frequent use of homosexual
characters as villains in 1950s television. While these may not have been particularly
positive portrayals of homosexual individuals on television, the representations did offer
an early visibility of homosexual characters in a time when homosexuality was only
discussed in relation to pathology and criminality—not the subject of popular television
programming.
The early representations of homosexuals became more visible in the 1970s with
gay-themed made-for-TV movies that featured not only gay characters but also gayrelated issues like the AIDS epidemic. Dow argues there were rules, however, for
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“repressing homosexuality” in television portrayals during the 1970s and 1980s. Those
rules, according to Dow (2001), were:
First, representations of gays and lesbians were incorporated as “one time”
appearances rather than as integral elements or regular characters in a series
narrative . . . Second, such characters are never “incidentally” gay; they appeared
in episodes or movies in which their sexuality was “the problem” to be solved;
third, the problem they represent is depicted largely in terms of its effect on
heterosexuals. Homosexual characters are rarely shown in their own communities,
homes, or same-sex romantic relationships but are depicted in terms of their place
in the lives of heterosexuals. Finally, and perhaps most crucially for a commercial
medium like television, representations of gay or lesbian sex, or even desire, are
absent. (p. 129)
Dow claims that a few of the rules were subverted in the 1990s but almost always in the
context of a comedic situation. She also asserts that the few prime-time representations of
gays and lesbians that have taken the risk of depicting actual gay and lesbian sexual
interaction “have predictably run afoul of sponsors and conservative interest groups” (p.
130). In contrast, by the early 2000s, gay representations in the media began to summon
large audiences, which yielded more advertising revenue (Streitmatter, 2009).
The myth of the gay buying bloc—affluent gay men with mountains of
expendable income for luxury products (Sender, 2001)—fueled the newest
representations of gay men on television. However, this new obsession with the buying
bloc alienated a larger swath of the diverse LGBTQ community in favor of the bank role
associated white, middle class gay men (Aslinger, 2009). With the emergence of shows
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like NBC’s Will & Grace and BRAVO TV’s Queer Eye for the Straight Guy, the
networks sought not only to represent the desired gay audience but also to attract the
viewers in a wider heterosexual audience who wanted to relate.
Sitcoms Go Gay
One of the first reoccurring gay roles on television was Billy Crystal’s Jodie on
the ABC sitcom Soap (1977 to 1981). The show has been both criticized for its
reinforcement of prevalent gay stereotypes from the late 1970s and lauded for its
groundbreaking depiction of a gay character on primetime network television
(Streitmatter, 2009). Streitmatter argues that the show included many demeaning
references or names for the gay character including: fruit, sissy, homo, and pansy, which
were generally used by family members during family functions and moments around the
table. According to Streitmatter, this somehow lessened the severity and the vitriol of the
comments.
At the same time, Streitmatter also claims the most repeated negative message
about homosexuality in Soap was the reinforcement of the “suicidal homosexual” (p. 38).
Crystal’s character, at one point in the show’s four seasons, attempted suicide because of
his unrequited love for a man who did not want to accept his same-sex attraction. Despite
reinforcing mainstream stereotypes of gay men, Streitmatter claims the show also
challenged other stereotypes. He argues that Crystal “put a new and highly attractive face
on homosexuality, as his on-screen persona was exceedingly personable and likeable” (p.
40). Streitmatter also claims that Crystal’s character, who was athletic and “a man of
honor and courage” worked against the established caricatures of gay men during the
time. Larry Gross (2001) found the representation problematic because of the changes in
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Crystal’s character, which seemed to grow less queer throughout the course of the show.
Gross (2001) argues:
[Jodie] began as a flamboyant gay character, toying with a sex-change operation:
when he first appeared he was wearing his mother’s dress. Shortly afterward, he
attempted suicide when his closeted lover left him. The next season Jody realized
he was actually bisexual becoming involved with a woman and fathering a child.
By the time the show was canceled Jody was embroiled in a custody fight and
preparing to marry another woman. (p. 84)
Streitmatter (2009) argues that Crystal’s character helped to facilitate a conversation
between “gays and non-gays” during the 1970s by talking about what gay visibility
meant for straight men as well as for gay men. Streitmatter’s analysis of Soap only
discusses the surface of the show without delving into how the show fit with the
dominant view of sexuality and the gay and lesbian movement’s ideologies. Also taking
into account Gross’ short but problematized assessment of the show’s gay character, the
first reoccurring gay character on network television probably worked to further
pathologize queer sexuality while giving preference to normal, heterosexual sex.
I’m Gay If That’s OK
Becker (2006) argues that by the 1990s the culture of male homosexual panic, the
conflict between heterosexual identity and the fear of being labeled homosexual, was
joined with a culture of heterosexual panic, which he maintains “describes what happens
when heterosexual men and women, still insecure about the boundary between gay and
straight, confront an increasingly accepted homosexuality” (p. 23). He argues that many
things contributed to “straight panic” in the 1990s, including the gay and lesbian civil
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rights movement and the “visibility of gayness in popular culture . . . on primetime
television” (p. 23).
Becker maintains that this shift from homosexual panic to heterosexual panic was
indicative of an American society that had a greater acceptance of social difference and
diversity—helped along by things like the debate over openly gay service members in the
United States military. He says, “Increasingly, Straight America(ns) faced a world where
being gay wasn’t so bad, where being straight wasn’t so effortless, and where social
identities in general and sexual identities in particular were increasingly relevant even as
the line between them became ever more indeterminate” (p. 24).
Additionally, Becker (2006) argues that these “new circumstances” could be
“disquieting” for straight, mainstream American culture, and that these anxieties were in
part exacerbated and negotiated via television programming during the 1990s and into the
early 2000s. Gross (2001) makes a similar but more nuanced argument. He says the
hallmark of gay and lesbian characters on television is that they are non-threatening to
heterosexual viewers. Dow (2001) makes a similar argument in her critique of the 1997
coming out of Ellen Degeneres’ character on Ellen. Dow argues, “. . . a useful parallel to
be drawn between Ellen and Cosby [Show], which is that just as Cosby was often
interpreted as a sitcom about black people that was largely geared toward the comfort of
white people, Ellen was a sitcom about a lesbian that was largely geared toward the
comfort of heterosexuals” (p. 129). The comfort of heterosexuals while portraying a
lesbian woman liberating herself from the closet is, as Dow assesses, a strategy used by
the network to claim great visibility for gays and lesbians, but at the same time, as not to
upset the heterosexist dominant culture.
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Dow also makes another important argument in the assessment of Ellen and the
position of personal versus political in her coming out story. According to Dow, the
coming out episodes and surrounding press worked to create an air of personal liberation
for DeGeneres and her character, which avoided any political statement that applied to a
wider range of queer sexualities. Dow argues that this “repression of the political—is
classic television strategy in its representations of marginalized groups, and it blinds us to
the contradictions inherent in claiming political progress from media representation” (p.
136). However, she claims media can empower certain groups, if only for a short time,
but that empowerment is fragile at best. Dow concludes, “Media avoidance of such
political stakes is more than mere omission; it should be recognized as an expression,
indeed a production, of power” (p. 137). In other words, the media has the power to
eliminate the political but give the aura of political progress by virtue of its power to
construct meaning.
Will & Grace
The coming out episodes of Ellen in many ways paved the way for other networks
to roll out additional shows with gay characters in the late 1990s. Perhaps the most
watched and most written about shows with openly gay characters and cast members
began with NBC’s Will & Grace, which featured the first major gay character in a
network television sitcom and was launched in 1998. In 2003, the cable network Bravo
TV, owned by NBC, began airing Queer Eye for the Straight Guy. Will & Grace, at the
peak of its eight-year run, reached a viewership of 19 million people (Streitmatter, 2009).
Several media scholars have both praised Will & Grace for its first-in-television depiction
of main gay characters and criticized it for its problematic representations of LGBTQ
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subjects (Avila-Saavedra, 2009; Battles & Hilton-Morrow, 2002; Cooper, 2003;
Linneman, 2008; Mitchell, 2005; Quimby, 2005; Shugart, 2003).
Battles and Hilton-Morrow (2002) provided one of the first examinations of Will
& Grace. They conclude that Will & Grace, though providing a first in television history
with a gay lead character, relied on “familiar situation comedy conventions” like equating
“gayness with a lack of masculinity . . . sexual tension and delayed consummation,
infantilizes the program’s most potentially subversive characters, and emphasizes
characters’ interpersonal relationships rather than the characters’ connection to the larger
social world” (p. 87). Further, the researchers argue that the show’s adherence to such
conventions did little to transgress mainstream norms that privilege heterosexual
relationships, and, thus, “can be seen as heteronormative” (p. 87). The show’s failure to
transgress the dominant views of sexuality and gayness is further seen, according to
Battles and Hilton-Morrow (2002), in Will’s character because “he offers a different
model for homosexuality” (p. 89). However, they and other scholars point to Will’s
“different” sexuality as a reinforcement of the heteronormative because of his ability to
“pass” as straight (Battles & Hilton-Morrow, 2002; Shugart, 2003).
Battles and Hilton-Morrow also contend that the show emphasizes interpersonal
relationships focused on gender dyads (male/female) rather than the characters’
connections to a larger social world, which could have possibly led straight viewers to the
assumption that we have entered into a “post-gay” period, “in which the struggle for gay
rights has already been won and that an individual’s personal rejection of homophobic
attitudes equals the improved social standing of sexual minorities. Viewers are
congratulated for their acceptance of gays and lesbians, but without any real
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consideration of the compromised lives of gays and lesbians within our heteronormative
culture” (p. 102). Mitchell (2005) argues that this avoidance of political messages and
adherence to heterosexual conventions allowed the show to be successful and suffer little
in the way of public backlash.
Mitchell (2005) calls it the show’s neo-liberal façade, which she argues, allowed
“the show to appeal to and further normalize oppressive ideologies of class, race,
sexuality, and patriarchy even while appearing to advocate on behalf of the gay Other”
(p. 1052). Mitchell (2005) argues that the show‘s writers use exaggeration and absurdity
to neutralize any exploration into political or controversial subjects like race, class,
gender, or sexuality. She claims, “Will & Grace is neither wholly subversive of nor
entirely complicit in hegemonic relations of power. Rather, like the larger culture in
which it is produced, the program is a site of contradiction, a site of ideological contest in
which values, practices, and social norms are enacted, challenged, and negotiated” (p.
1063). She maintains the show did not work to produce a narrative that would counter
racism, sexism, or heterosexism though the show did contradict the studio system’s
reliance on heterosexuality as the norm for primetime television. However, she argues,
“the inclusion of sexual difference may enable the program to more effectively secure
systemic social inequity because it appears progressive” (p. 1064).
Similarly, Shugart (2003) argues shows like Will & Grace (gay man/straight
woman partnerships) perpetuate the notion to women that only conventionally defined
straight men carry out sexist practices and that gay men, because of their lack of sexual
attraction toward straight women, cannot perpetrate the practices. She claims this notion
renormalizes “sexism under a host of ‘exceptional’ circumstances” and the “implications
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for gay men are that the price of privilege is sexism, a fact that necessarily defines them
by their heteronormative sexual relationships with women. The gay men in these
configurations thus become patriarchal allies—rather than adversaries—in efforts to
naturalize and reproduce heteronormative politics” (p. 89). Quimby (2005) in reference to
Will’s and Grace’s relationship on the show, argues that the dynamics of their
relationships could simultaneously defy the dominant ideology concerning heterosexual
relationships and marriage while at the same time bolstering the dominant ideology.
Similar to Will & Grace, Queer Eye for the Straight Guy has met a mix of critical views
that generally see the show as a missed opportunity to actually transgress the dominant
ideologies of sexuality and heterosexual privilege.
The Fab Five
The year 2003 was labeled by media outlets as the “Year of the Queer” because of
the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Lawrence v. Texas, which declared sodomy laws
unconstitutional, and because of the popularity of shows like Will & Grace and the newly
launched Queer Eye for the Straight Guy. Bravo TV went from the outskirts of television
networks to the top of the ratings charts with a new reality make over show, Queer Eye
for the Straight Guy. Bravo, affiliated with NBC under the larger umbrella of Universal,
landed a moneymaker in Queer Eye, and critics and viewers, along with advertisers,
fawned over the show. Although the show provided an outlet for a nearly invisible group,
gay men, in mainstream television, it often did so by ignoring the overarching
heteronormative hegemony at play in society (Papacharissi & Fernback, 2008;
Westerfelhaus & Lacroix, 2006).
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Westerfelhaus and Lacroix (2006) critically examine the first two seasons of
Queer Eye to shed light on what they termed a “strategic rhetoric of heteronormativity,”
which speaks to the natural or normal status given to heterosexuals and heterosexuality in
culture, law, politics, religion, and “social understandings of human sexuality” (p. 428).
They argue that the typical episode of Queer Eye, “functions as a ritual that supports the
sociosexual order while seeming to challenge the order’s heterosexist attitudes and
values.” In other words, the show intends to challenge the dominant view of queer
individuals and problematize heteronormativity through visibility, but, in actuality, the
content further perpetuates the dominant social order, which privileges the heterosexual
as natural and normal and relegates queer sex to dirty, criminal, and unnatural. The five
protagonists of Queer Eye, the researchers argue, are given a brief pass within the
heterosexual hegemony to violate some boundaries with the understanding that they will
not go too far and that they will eventually return to status quo. They contend, “Rather
than threatening the dominant order, such rituals actually promote social stability, even as
they seem to challenge it. They do so by reaffirming the values and reasserting the social
structure of the dominant order” (p. 430).
Therefore, they argue the “Fab Five” contested the hierarchy with homoerotic
innuendo, touching, and teasing, but failed to actually upset the hierarchy by stopping
short of challenging the sociosexual hegemony (Westerfelhaus & Lacroix, 2006).
Similarly, Papacharissi and Fernback (2008) claim that Queer Eye’s departure from the
heteronormative—it reversed the typical role of the gay man in society where the gay
characters had a dominant role over the straight men—was a rouse. The presence of
dominant gay characters appeared to transgress the dominant heteronormative status quo
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and hail the homonormative alternative but fell short. Papacharissi and Fernback also
argue, “The prominence of gay characters allows gay audiences to feel empowered, but at
the same time, is packaged within the trendy aesthetic of gay chic, which does not
capture the realities of the gay conscience. Like gay window advertising, Queer Eye
sustains popularity by overtly and covertly ‘winking’ to a sexually diverse audience,
while resting on commodified portrayals of sexuality” (p. 352).
The researchers also argue that although there appear to be homonormative
discourses present in the show, the dominant heteronormative power structures are
“ultimately reinforced.” They claim the role reversal present in Queer Eye “advertises a
veneer of homonormativity,” but the text ultimately marginalizes the queer characters
into traditional heterosexist categories that negatively portray gay men or stereotype them
as more feminine. The gay men in the show are experts at grooming, housekeeping,
decorating, cooking, and culture, which paints them into the realm of the feminine and
does nothing to subordinate the dominant heterosexist vision of homosexuality.
According to Papacharissi and Fernback (2008), the show also complicates the
relationship between the gay characters and the straight men they are making over. The
show presents the relationships, which are portrayed as positive, as transient. There is no
inclination that the relationships have lasting power, rather they are only the product of
an unusual or extraordinary situation—they are not normal in the heterosexual sense.
Ultimately, Papacharissi and Fernback argue the reality show was designed and aired to
appeal to a wide variety of viewers. The researchers refer to the “polysemic structure” of
the show as a source of its attraction to a wide mainstream audience. In other words,
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because so many different meanings could be attached to the show from different people,
it appealed to both straight and queer audiences, which, in turn, appealed to advertisers.
The criticism from researchers regarding programming either aimed at or
representative of queer audiences suggests a lack of a queer audience; however, queer
audiences generally viewed the programs in large numbers as well. Westerfelhaus and
Lacroix (2006) argue that queer audiences, to some extent, have so long been deprived of
representation of any sort in the mainstream television and film industries that any
representation seems to be a step forward. The same is true, to some extent, for viewers
of programming on Logo TV, the television network created to attract gay and lesbian
viewers. The images seen have been the primary images and representations projected by
the mainstream. Therefore, they seem to be “normal” even in the context of a queer
network. The heteronormalization of queer representations in television, which are
bought into by both the mainstream and queer community, have created lucrative
television franchises and an air of collusion that not only aids in the perpetuation of the
heteronormative hegemony in the mainstream but also within queer media as well.
What previous television representations of queer sexuality all seem to have in
common is the avoidance of a politics of sex. The characters are stripped of their political
agency, which is often replaced with a personal narrative of liberation that is often
centered on same-sex marriage, parenthood, military service, or identity politics. These
more conservative aims of the gay and lesbian community have a long history within the
movement, but are also challenged by a queer critique that argues for a wider
representation of queer sexuality and a politics of sex—which is seen as more subversive
to the heteronormative constructions of sexuality, gender, race, and class.
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Method
For the purposes of this study, I will analyze the discourse of sexuality, gender,
race, and class within the context of LGBTQ characters on primetime television—
specifically in the five programs mentioned previously. The shows will be analyzed via a
textual analysis using Stuart Hall’s (1986) preferred reading theory. Fiske’s (1984) argues
that television is polysemy, meaning multiple meanings can be extracted from the same
text. Similarly, Hall asserts that viewers negotiate with the text via their own social
setting, which may lie outside the dominant ideology. Hall (1986) contends that text can
be read from three, different positions—preferred, negotiated, and oppositional—within
the dominant ideology. Hall maintains all discourse operates through a code. Further, he
contends, that discourse is sometimes decoded through a dominant reading in which the
consumer uses the dominant cues of society to understand the meaning assigned by the
producer of the information—this is the preferred reading. A negotiated reading is
produced “by a viewer who fits into the dominant ideology in general but who needs to
inflect it locally to take account of his or her social position” (Fiske, 1992). In other
words, the reader allies with the dominant ideology in some instances but conflicts with it
in others. Finally the oppositional reading is a total rejection of the dominant reading.
Hall (1986) claims some audience members may “detotalize” or deconstruct the
“preferred” code to reconstruct an alternative message within “some alternative
framework of reference” (p. 138). The oppositional reading of the text allows for
rejection of the dominant cues and assignment of meaning based on an oppositional
viewpoint.
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The initial reading included 50 hours of television programming from the 20122013 network television season—Glee (22 episodes, 45 minutes each), Modern Family
(24 episodes, 22 minutes each), The New Normal (22 episodes, 22 minutes each), Go On
(22 episodes, 22 minutes each), and Happy Endings (23 episodes, 22 minutes each).
From the overall database of episodes (Appendix A), only episodes involving LGBTQ
characters or subject matter directly were closely analyzed in the second round of
analysis, and, upon further analysis, particular episodes or portions of episodes that
represented prevalent themes and issues were pinpointed for use in the final study. The
analysis of the text (the television programs) underwent a three-part process that began
with a detailed descriptive analysis of the text. A descriptive analysis for each show was
done independently to ensure all major themes were discussed. The final analysis
provides readings from three of the five shows, Modern Family, those shows with main
gay characters and prominent gay-themed plot lines. As stated before, a queer analysis of
television programs that does not consider any aspect of identity beyond sexuality
silences those who identify at intersections of sexuality, gender, race, and class.
Chapter III focuses on the construction of a normative sexuality in the programs,
with specific attention given to the shaming of queer sexuality, which does not mesh well
with the dominant heteronormative conceptualization of sexuality and the
homonormative construction of “romantic love.” Chapter IV takes a deeper look at how
the issues of privilege, race, and gender in the network television sitcoms. The main
focus is on the symbolic annihilation of LGBTQ people of color and the subversion of
women via a heterodominant gender structure. Chapter V examines issues of class and
consumption in the programs, which excludes any queer individual not belonging to a
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constructed gay buying bloc consisting of affluent gay men with large disposable
incomes. Lastly, Chapter VI includes my conclusion, which consists of implications for
LGBTQ people and future areas of research.
As stated previously, the purpose of this study is to analyze the discourse
regarding LGBTQ issues and people in network television sitcoms. This research is
important in understanding the American public’s most recent shifts in opinion on issues
of marriage equality and the legitimacy of same-sex relationships. I examined the
potential for television programs to normalize a particular brand of gay and lesbian
identity, which possibly resembles the dominant heterosexuality. This normalized
identity aids in the advancement of white, middle class gays and lesbians who privatize
sexuality and mimic dominant conventions of sexuality, gender, race, and class in the
public sphere. Further, it is important to examine the underlying ideology of these
programs to extract meanings that have the potential to further subvert queer notions of
sex and sexual politics, race, gender, and class, which only work to further marginalize
those that do not fit the dominant mold.
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CHAPTER III
GOOD GAY, BAD QUEER
Yet the image of the Good Gay is never invoked without its shadow in mind—the
Bad Queer, the kind who has sex, who talks about it, and who builds with other
queers a way of life that ordinary folk do not understand or control.
—Michael Warner (1999, p. 114)
Gay and lesbian nuptials are nothing new to primetime, network situational
comedies. In the mid-1990s, two popular sit-coms, Roseanne and Friends, depicted
wedding or commitment ceremonies involving recurring, gay and lesbian secondary
characters. The popular ABC sitcom, Roseanne, featured the first-ever primetime
television gay wedding on December 12, 1995. The central character, Roseanne, plans
the ceremony for her business partner and recurring character, Leon. The over-the-top
ceremony described by Leon during the episode as “one gigantic, offensive, Roseanniacle
ball of wrong” (Walker & Mancuso, 1995) essentially worked to show, in contrast to the
spectacle planned by Roseanne, that ceremonies between two men are the same as
between a man and a woman. In other words, the ceremony demonstrated that gay
weddings, like straight weddings, are all about love between two people.
That episode of Rosanne followed by an early 1996 episode of the NBC sitcom
Friends, which featured the lesbian wedding of Ross’ ex-wife, Carol, to another woman,
focused on an equality of sameness in their message regarding same-sex unions. Candice
Gingrich, the lesbian sister of then Republican House Speaker Newt Gingrich, who
vehemently opposed same-sex civil unions or marriage, starred as the officiate in the
Friends same-sex wedding episode. Candice Gingrich’s script seems to be more of a
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commentary aimed at the religious right than at gay and lesbian audience members.
Gingrich’s character begins the wedding service by saying, “You know, nothing makes
God happier than when two people, any two people, come together in love. Friends,
family, we’re gathered here today to join Carol and Susan in holy matrimony” (Abrams
& Schlamme 1996). Gingrich’s script, which emphasized sameness as equality, was not a
novel idea on 1990s primetime television. According to Becker (2006), many television
narratives in the 1990s revolved round the notion that gays and lesbians were
“indistinguishable” from straight people (p. 185). The assimilationist narrative, as many
have argued (Becker, 2006; Dow, 2001; Duggan, 2003; Warner, 1999), works more to
ease the minds of straight viewers than to promote the rights of gays and lesbians. By
presenting an image of gay and lesbian characters void of sexual agency, the television
shows do not challenge the heteronormative assumptions regarding marriage, family, and
sexuality, which is what Warner (1999) argues is the goal of many same-sex marriage
proponents within the gay and lesbian movement. He argues marriage rights would
further solidify societal sex norms that alienate alternatives to the monogamous, married
couple unit. He claims, “An alternative would be harder than ever to articulate or
legitimate since marriage would have received the imprimatur of the very movement that
had once come into being to open up different life horizons for them” (p. 93).
Warner argues that an assimilationist view that aimed to make gay and straight
indistinguishable would create a divide between the good gay, the gay man who reflects
the dominant heterosexual world in every way, and the bad queer, a person who works to
transgress gender norms, explore sexuality publicly, or refuses to mimic the
heteronormative prescription for relationships and families. The good gay became the
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norm for 1990s and 2000s television sitcoms. Has the same trend continued into the
current decade with so many more shows focused on gay and lesbian main characters and
themes?
The purpose of this chapter is to explore more recent depictions of gay couples in
network television sitcoms, and how those depictions further work to normalize a gay
sexuality that promotes heteronormative and homonormative ideals regarding marriage,
parenting, and sexual expression. First, I will examine the history of the marriage equality
movement along with the opposition to the movement from both within and outside the
LGBTQ rights movement, and how the movement, in many ways, works to promote
heterosexuality as a desired model and queer sexuality as the antithesis of equality. I will
also discuss same-sex parenting as an extension of same-sex marriage and heterosexual
privilege. Secondly, I will examine the relationships of the gay couples for evidence of
heteronormative and homonormative privileging and the symbolic annihilation of any
queer subject falling outside the preferred heteronormative model. Warner (1999) argues
that most arguments for marriage equality either work to shame queer sexuality or work
to annihilate any other alternative sexuality
Marriage Equality as a Movement
Warner (1999) claims marriage did not become the “dominant” issue of the
lesbian and gay movement until the 1990s. The marriage movement began with a case
decided by the Hawaii Supreme Court in 1993. In Baehr v. Lewin, the Hawaii Supreme
Court ruled that prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying amounted to discrimination.
In response to the Hawaii court ruling, federal lawmakers successfully passed the
Defense of Marriage Act in 1996. DOMA, among other things, excluded the federal
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government from recognition of same-sex marriages allowed by individual states,
meaning all rights given to heterosexual married couples could not be given to same-sex
married couples even if they were legally married in the United States. Before Baehr v.
Lewin, the idea of marriage equality occasionally surfaced. Since the 1970s, the Hawaii
case and a few other instances of gay and lesbian couples trying unsuccessfully to attain
marriage rights were the thrust of the steps taken (Warner, 1999). Warner argues, “The
mere posing of the issue was a jolt. It made heterosexuality of marriage visible, to many
people, for the first time . . . And it advanced a claim of equality that had undeniable
appeal” (p. 87). The topic of same-sex marriage remained quiet for twenty-five years
within the queer movement for many reasons, according to Warner, all of which center
on the “need to resist the state regulation of sexuality” (p. 88).
Warner (1999) reasons that marriage rights and state sanctioned gay sex would
further solidify societal sex norms that alienate alternatives to the married unit. He
maintains “an alternative would be harder than ever to articulate or legitimate since
marriage would have received the imprimatur of the very movement that had once come
into being to open up different life horizons for them” (p. 93). Similarly, Prasad (2008)
claims marriage has prejudicial effects on society, which include “the fortification of
inequality through the reification of patriarchy and heterosexism, and the unnecessary
regulation of human sexual expression” (p. 195). The concept of sex complementarity,
that there are essential differences between men and women thus making opposite-sex
relationships more legitimate and whole, plays a major role in the functioning of the
heterosexual, patriarchal institution of marriage. Prasad claims sex complementarity has
been the foundation for how marriage as an institution has been viewed in our culture;
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thus, heterosexual marriage is conflated with natural and normal. Both Warner (1999)
and Prasad (2008) argue that the conflation of heteronormative with natural and good
problematizes any alternatives. For that reason, gay and lesbian relationships that
resemble the sex complementarity then are seen as legitimate and good while any other
relationship that falls outside of that construct or in some way challenges the patriarchy is
not natural or bad. The prescribed heteronormative model includes private sexuality,
gender binary roles, race, and class.
Warner (1999) claims that one of the arguments in favor of same-sex marriage is
that it would normalize queer behavior as well as queer “self understanding” (p. 111). He
claims that some marriage supporters see marriage as a way to change the sex lives of
gays and lesbians—a way to “not challenge the norms of straight culture” or “flaunt
sexuality” or live “differently from ordinary folk” (p. 113). They see marriage as a way to
“civilize” the sexual culture of gay men. Warner contends that many of the arguments for
same-sex marriage rely on the same homophobia used in the arguments from anti-gay
and anti-ame-sex marriage opponents. Warner sees the fight for same-sex marriage as a
choice between two arguments: “Embrace the politics of shame outright, allowing
married gay couples to be relieved of stigma in order to make its coercive effects felt all
the more by the unmarried; or simply deny that the legal institution of marriage has any
connection to the politics of shame at all” (p. 114). In other words, abandon the broader
fight for social justice to extend a privilege to a few, who may be able to avoid
stigmatization or symbolically annihilate anyone who does not fit the mold or subscribe
to the argument. Warner contends marriage is a privilege—a package that is sanctioned
and enforced by a third party, the state. Marriage is not needed, however, to extend the
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benefits of marriage to people outside the institution, which are social justice issues and
should be fought for as such.
Warner states there are no specific benefits to same-sex marriage in a broader
queer movement. Green (2010), on the other hand, argued that contrary to the warnings
of queer and feminist activists and researchers, many gay and lesbian married couples do
not uniformly subscribe to modern marriage conventions such as monogamy and
heteronormative gender roles, meaning same-sex marriage could offer a queer rendering
of heteronormative marriage.
Queering marriage
Some researchers argue same-sex marriage provides a way in which to challenge
the patriarchy of marriage by upsetting the dominant/submissive dichotomy, which is
analogous with heteronormative marriage (Green, 2010; Prasad, 2008). Queering of
marriage then transgresses the privilege of marriage by bucking not only the patriarchal
conventions of heteronormative marriage but also by bucking the homonormative notions
of love and romance (Clare, 2013). The heteronormative and homonormative conceptions
of marriage work to depoliticize sexuality and the struggle to obtain social justice through
creating same-sex marriage in the patriarchal image and grounding marriage in the
visceral conceptions of romance and love. Prasad (2008) contends, “Same-sex marriage
poses a clear threat to the patriarchal code. By obfuscating the sexed rule that husbands
are to dominate over their wives, same-sex marriage posits the institution of marriage in a
state of transgression from orthodoxy” (p. 208). Prasad (2008) also maintains:
The queer marriage is not so much concerned about the anatomy of those engaged
in marriage as it is preoccupied with destabilizing the normalization of
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heterosexual patriarchy. In sum, the queer marriage seeks to defy the dichotomy
of good (read: heterosexual, male-headed) versus bad (read: homosexual, femaleheaded) households it makes marriage more ameliorable by not excluding the
already disenfranchised from having full standing in the institution. (p. 206)
However, Prasad (2008) warns that if the patriarchal code that has ruled marriage
historically continues to be unchallenged after same-sex marriage rights are gained, then
same-sex marriage becomes a tool for symmetrical equality, and resembles the
heteronormative. Further, he claims that marriage equality would not act as a
“substantively liberating endeavor” from oppressive societal norms and conventions (p.
209).
Similar to the heteronormative conception of marriage, with patriarchal pitfalls,
the homonormative conception of marriage works to privilege marriage through romance
as a means to be normal and apolitical (Clare, 2013). In other words, the transgression of
gay intimacy or sex can be camouflaged in romance. Romance blends queer sexuality in
with the heterosexual world around it. Clare argues, “With love, you can appear so long
as you disappear: gay intimacy can appear when it disappears in universal love” (p. 794).
Therefore, same-sex relationships can appear so long as they are described in a romantic
way, but not in a way that makes queer sexuality visible. According to Grindstaff (2003),
a similar invisibility is forced upon women within the discourse of marriage and
sexuality. Grindstaff argues that heterosexual women are not allowed sexual agency,
desire, or practices because women work as the agent of monogamy within in the
heteronormative. However, within the homonormative, lesbians act in contrast to the
perceived promiscuity of gay men. In both the heteronormative and homonormative,
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lesbians are marginalized because the lesbian identity is voided of sexual behavior; thus,
it is not important to the maintenance of the heteronormative marriage.
The struggle to queer marriage, to transgress dominant conceptions of marriage
and relationships, can also be seen in same-sex parenting. Gay and lesbian couples who
raise children find themselves in a position of either reinforcing the heteronormative or
challenging the norms.
Same-Sex Parenting
Hopkins, Sorensen, and Taylor (2013) argue that same-sex parents continually
negotiate what they term a “dialectic of accommodation and resistance,” meaning that
they simultaneously confirm and reject heteronormative family structures. They argue
that while same-sex families may, more than ever, resemble their heterosexual
counterparts, they have not “fully embraced the heteronormative ideal” (p. 106). They
found that gay and lesbian parents acquire children in a variety of non-traditional ways,
raise children to adopt more fluid gender roles, shirk traditional divisions of labor within
the home, and do not always adopt monogamous sexual relationships. However, “When
same-sex couples become parents and seek legal recognition of their relationships
through marriage, they embrace a fundamentally heteronormative and heterosexist
institution that has traditionally defined what kinds of sexual relationships, gender roles,
and families are legitimate” (Ortyl, 2012, p. 106). Often the question becomes more
about how the children adjust to same-sex parenting and what long-term effects gay and
lesbian parents’ sexuality may have on their children. In fact, multiple studies have been
conducted to answer that question—can same-sex parents provide a nurturing and healthy
environment for children?
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Studies conducted generally rely on quantitative analyses of self-reported survey
data that compares children with same-sex parents to those of opposite-sex parents or
single parents, with mixed results. Other studies, such as the one conducted by Landau
(2009), examine the way media presents the children of same-sex couples. She argues,
“The progeny of same-sex parents are portrayed like lab rats in a social experiment,
testing the homophobic hypothesis that gay and lesbian parents make gay children” (p.
91). Landau claims these representations depict gay-headed households as problematic
when compared to the normalcy of opposite-sex counterparts. Further, the U.S. print
media often presents same-sex parenting as acceptable only if the children are properly
masculine or feminine and straight. Landau claims that often news media rely on a
“common trope of heterosexual reproduction” (p. 90). This trope privileges, according to
Landau, heterosexual, biological reproduction—intercourse between a male parent and
female parent. She contends these constructions “‘other’ the range of origins of children
of same-sex parents, thus relegating them to an outer social-scientific space” (p. 90). This
social-scientific space relegates the children to the position of the studied rather than the
living—as a question to be answered. Landau argues that mass media outlets generally
discuss the sexuality of children of same-sex parents as if continuing the social science
experimentation. The stories often assertively pronounce the children’s heterosexuality
because, as Landau argues, “Homosexuality is not preferred and gay parenting is only
good for its role in repeating extreme heterosexuality in children” (p. 92).
For example, in 2012, a study published by Regnerus (2012) received a great deal
of media attention because the researcher claims children of heterosexual parents are
better adjusted and succeed at higher rates when they are raised by their married father
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and mother, who remain married throughout the child’s life. Regnerus also claims
previous research that suggested the children of lesbian parents do as well as those with
opposite-sex parents is flawed because the samples used in those studies were limited. In
the same edition of the Social Science Research journal, Marks (2012) argues that
differences between the children of lesbian mothers and those raised by a married father
and mother include: (a) health, mortality, and suicide risks, (b) drug and alcohol abuse,
(c) criminality and incarceration, (d) intergenerational poverty, (e) education and/or labor
force contribution, early sexual activity and early childbearing, and (g) divorce rates as
adults. (p. 735). Marks asserts that a brief released by the American Psychological
Association, which stated the children of lesbian and gay parents lead as successful and
happy of lives as their counterparts in heterosexual families, may have been premature
and not guided by appropriate and accurate research.
All of the research presented in that edition of Social Science Research is
concerned with the subject of children raised by same-sex parents, which are justified, in
the words of the researchers, because of a shifting cultural climate in which same-sex
parenting is becoming more and more common (Amato, 2012; Eggebeen, 2012;
Regnerus, 2012; Marks, 2012). Eggebeen (2012) claims, “The immediate concern that
drives the studies on children raised by gay or lesbian parents is obvious. We are
currently undergoing a cultural and legal battle over whether same-gender partners
should be allowed to marry and this debate is, in part, grounded on scientific conclusions
about gay or lesbian couple’s fitness as parents” (p. 775). Landau’s assertion that the
children of same-sex parents have become social science lab rats holds true with the
release of the 2012 research with one exception. Amato (2012) argues, in the same
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edition, no matter the results of social science research the data “should not be used to
restrict the civil rights of any group of individuals” (p. 774). The argument over the
viability of same-sex parenting in the real world becomes an oft-presented subject on
primetime television, where gay parents or soon-to-be gay parents work to be seen as
equal to their straight counterparts.
The remainder of the chapter focuses on examples that represent prevalent themes
found in all of the programs in the way of sexuality, marriage, and parenting. In most
cases, the examples are a blend of all three areas. I have extended Warner’s thesis that all
arguments in favor of same-sex marriage either shame alternative sexualities or ignore
alternative sexualities to parenting and family. I will begin with examples where
shaming, which was used throughout all five programs, helped to align the on-screen
families with heteronormative standards of sex and family. I end this chapter with
examples in which the topic of sexuality was ignored. Instead, the movement for
marriage equality is placed within a modified queer memory of marriage and family
rights, which is contextualized via a conjured history of the gay rights movement.
Sex Shaming
The fourth season of Modern Family, starts where season three ends. Modern
Family is an award-winning sitcom from ABC, which features two gay parents, Mitchell
and Cam, who adopted their daughter Lily from Vietnam in the first season and tried
unsuccessfully to adopt a son in the third season. The third season ends with Cam and
Mitchell learning that the birth mother’s grandmother convinces her to keep the child
they are set to adopt. The fourth season begins with Mitch and Cam processing the news
and disappointment, but with a house full of baby toys and “empty picture frames,” the
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process is revealed to the viewer to be difficult. Mitch and Cam both work to appear fine
with the disappointment outwardly, to both themselves and to family members, but are
clearly, at least to the viewer, not fine. However, their revelation is handled with humor
that on the surface appears to poke fun at the insecurities of gay men trying to achieve the
heterodominant world of parenting.
After the opening credits, the scene shows Mitch and Cam sitting in their kitchen
talking about coffee—what kind of coffee, what kind of milk is in the coffee—when
Mitchell begins to break the forced monotony of the avoidant conversation:
“Okay. This is ridiculous. We need to talk about the elephant in the room.” The camera
pans to a giant stuffed elephant sitting in the corner, revealing the double meaning of
Mitch’s statement. The scene cuts to a confessional style interview, which is a staple of
the show, with Mitch and Cam discussing the elephant:
Cam: The giant stuffed elephant was a gift from our good friend Pepper.
Mitch: Gay guys having kids is . . . it’s relatively new, so our community has not
yet learned how to modulate baby gifts.
Cam: When Steven and Stefan had little Rocco, our friend Longinus sent over the
whole cast of “Yo Gabba Gabba.”
Mitch: Now Rocco cries whenever he sees bright colors.
Cam: Now I’m not allowed over there. [A reference to the bright colored shirts
Cam often wears.]
After the confessional, the scene shifts back to the kitchen and Cam replies, “I guess we
should donate it somewhere, along with the 800-pound gorilla. [Camera pans to a giant
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stuffed gorilla next to the elephant] I mean, you know, now that we’re not getting a
baby.”
The scene continues with both Cam and Mitch reassuring each other that not
“getting a baby” is the best decision for the entire family only to be interrupted by Lily,
the couples’ adopted daughter, who asks of the whereabouts of her “new baby brother.”
Cam and Mitch explain to Lily that the family is no longer gaining a new baby. She
replies to their comforting with a request for a kitten that she will name Larry, the name
she picked for the new baby brother she was expecting. The focus of the family shifts
then to adopting a new cat for Lily. Later in the episode, the three of them are shown
selecting a cat at a local animal shelter—a process that begins to mimic the process the
couple went through in their attempt to adopt a child:
Cam: Okay, hi. Yes, we’re gonna take this one.
Clerk: Oh, I’m gonna need you to slow down a bit. There’s a process we need to
go through to see if you’re a suitable cat guardian.
Cam: Oh really? Because I thought the process was, I say, “We’ll take this one.”
And then you say, “Thank God because we have too many cats.”
Clerk: No. We need to ensure these cats are going to good homes. That’s why we
need you to fill out this form, and then there’ll be a site visit.
Mitch: Okay, um, we’ve just been through a very frustrating year trying to adopt a
baby so . . . You’ll forgive us if we’re not really in the mood to jump through too
many hoops for a cat.
Clerk: Oh? Why wouldn’t they give you a baby?
Cam: It’s complicated.
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Clerk: So are cats.
Mitchell: Are they? ‘Cause that one over there has been licking itself ever since
we got here. Okay, you know what? I’m . . . I can’t do this.
Lily: What about Larry?
Mitch: I’m sorry, Lily. Not today.
[Scene switches to the confessional interview.]
Cam: Mitchell stormed off, but I couldn’t. I had to give her a piece of my mind.
Mitch: And how’d that go?
Cam: I may have strayed off topic just a bit.
[Scene changes back to the animal adoption tent.]
Clerk: No, sir!
Cam: No, she will always be Norma Jeane Baker to me.
Clerk: What is your point exactly?
Cam: That like the thrice-married starlet, this cat is being deprived a stable home.
Clerk: I’m sorry if you’re upset.
Cam: You’re the one who should be upset, ma’am. We are animal lovers. That cat
would’ve been on the receiving end of affection 24 hours a day. Satisfying its
every need would’ve been our top priority. [As Cam makes his argument, Mitch
drives by with the giant elephant and gorilla strapped to the top of his Prius. Mitch
is in the middle of making the “car dance” for Lily, which means he’s pumping
the brakes to make the car bounce. The dancing effect creates the effect of the two
stuffed animals having sex on top of the car.] Okay, in light of that tableau, I
would like to take back the phrase: receiving end.
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Later in the episode, the story line comes back to Cam and Mitchell in the parking lot
trying to rearrange the animals on the roof of the car to avoid another “sexual” position.
The two come to the realization that they are not entirely fine with the failed adoption
attempt because it left a void in their future plans.
Cam: You know, I had our mornings all planned out. The baby and I would walk
Lily to kindergarten and then cut back home through the park and feed those
ducks that you’re not supposed to feed but everybody does.
Mitch: I bought a picture frame for my desk, and it’s just sitting there, waiting for
his face.
The two come to terms with their unhappiness and decide that the animals are finally in a
“perfectly innocent” position on the car roof before they drive off to reveal that the
animals are in yet another sexual position.
In terms of extracting meaning from the text, the television program, we must
consider Fiske’s (1987) assertion that television is polysemy, having multiple meanings.
He argues that the audience reads and interacts with the program through particular
ideologies that help them make meaning of the text. Fiske contends that characters in
television programs are encodings of dominant ideology, which help the audience to
make sense out of them. But he contends not everyone reads the characters or the
programs in the same way because they come to the program with their own knowledge
and experiences. Similarly, Hall (1986) argues that all discourse operates through code
that the audience learns to interpret through societal cues. Further, he contends that
discourse is sometimes decoded through a “dominant” or “preferred” reading in which
the audience member uses the dominant cues of society to understand the meaning
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assigned by the producer of the information. However, Hall also claims many audience
members will attach their own “ground rules” to the reading of a text in a “negotiated”
reading of a text (p. 137). Finally, Hall (1986) maintains some audience members may
“detotalize” or deconstruct the “preferred” code to reconstruct an alternative message
within “some alternative framework of reference” (p. 138). This “oppositional” reading
of the text allows for rejection of the dominant cues and assignment of meaning based on
an oppositional viewpoint. For the remainder of this chapter I will provide “preferred”
and “negotiated” or “oppositional” readings of the examples chosen from the programs. I
will begin with the “preferred” readings, which account for the readings intended by the
producers of the programs. Finally, I will provide “negotiated” or “oppositional” readings
of the programs that challenge the dominant cues used in the “preferred” reading.
A “preferred” reading of the elephant and gorilla refers to Mitchell and Cam’s
emotions after losing a child and trying to process the feelings with reminders all
around—the toys, the empty picture frames, the plans that will never happen. However,
the gorilla and the elephant also lend to a more “oppositional” reading. The elephant and
gorilla refer to something else that is never discussed or resolved—sex. Cam and Mitchell
are apprehensive about their sex becoming public—the 800-pound gorilla and giant
elephant in the room are non-heterosexual sex. The apprehension is heightened when
those private fears and worries are made public—when the two animals appear to be
having sex on the roof of the car. The notion that somehow the perceived perversion of
non-heterosexual intercourse is destructive to the family unit is apparent in this episode,
and it makes Cam and Mitchell unfit to adopt a cat never mind a male child. The
conservative notion of parenthood then becomes an agent in the hiding of sexuality. Cam
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and Mitchell are quick to give away the elephant and the gorilla to hide their sexuality
and normalize their family unit. In other words, queer sex makes them unfit for
parenthood or a place in the heteronormative discourse of the gay rights movement.
Similarly in episode three of The New Normal, an NBC program that was
cancelled after its first season, titled “Baby Clothes,” David and Bryan, the gay main
characters of the program who hire a surrogate to give birth to their child, encounter
resistance to their efforts toward parenthood. A man in a baby-clothing store confronts
them about a public display of affection they share in front of his child. Bryan and David
are more concerned about defending themselves and their future child than about being
public with sexuality. Shaming of public sexuality, in this case in the form of public
affection by non-queer people, is not seen as a threat to sexuality but a threat to their
children. As the episode progresses, the fear of what their child may have to endure is
lessened by their ability to stand up for what they think is right. They come to the
realization that they and their child will have to endure attacks no matter what, even if
they were not a gay couple, but they have to instill in their child the ability to cope with
such attacks and to learn from them.
During the episode Bryan and David accompany Goldie, the couple’s surrogate,
to an outlet mall to do some shopping for Shania, Goldie’s daughter. During the trip, a
straight couple confronts David and Bryan about a kiss the two share in the children’s
clothing department:
Man: Wow!
Bryan: Excuse me?
Man: Would you mind not doing that?
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Bryan: Oh, no, it’s OK. He’s actually going to let me buy this thing [in reference
to baby hat on his head].
Man: No. Uh, don’t do that in front of my daughter. Kissing another man. This is
a family store, and I shouldn’t have to go home and explain that to my kid.
Bryan: Explain what?
Man: Look, I don’t care what kind of crap you do in the privacy of your own
home, but don’t bring it in here.
David: Let’s just go. It’s not worth it.
Bryan: No, no, no. Explain what sir? Love?
Man: There are places you’d get your ass kicked for that crap. I’m trying to be
cool here.
Bryan: Oh, well, you really are being cool, sir. Thanks for your intolerance and
your bigotry and for fostering this ignorance in another generation. And for
bringing back the fanny pack.
Following the exchange Bryan and David are upset that they did not stand up more for
themselves, and they worry what life will be like for their child as he or she grows up
with two dads.
David: You’re not still thinking about the guy from the outlet mall, are you? That
was an isolated incident. Honey, it’s OK.
Bryan: It’s not OK.
David: There will always be stupid jerks in the world. You can’t let them bother
you. Just ignore them.
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Bryan: That’s your plan? Ignore them? I’ve been ignoring people like that my
entire life, David. That’s not good enough anymore. We’re having baby.
David: Yes, God willing, everything’s chromosomally correct . . .
Bryan: Will you stop that?! We are bringing a baby into a world where idiot
people feel free to say and do the things they say and do because we have been
trained to ignore them! That guy is not the problem. We are the problem.
David: Well, what did you want me to do? Get in his face? I’m not that guy.
Bryan: I don’t know! I’m not crying for me. I’m crying because what if that
happened in front of your kid? What will we do then? Just be ashamed of who we
are? What kind of message does that send to our child? I don’t want our kid to
feel that. To see him or her get hurt like that, that would just kill me. As a parent,
you’re supposed to protect your child. You tell them not to play in the street, andand don’t do drugs and wear a thick Shea butter moisturizer at night. But how are
we supposed to protect your baby from hate?
Later at the gym David defends another gym member, who is intellectually disabled,
from a third gym member’s insensitive comments. The guy yells in the smoothie line,
“Will you give the idiot an IQ boost already? This retard’s holding up the line!” After
David punches the guy for insulting the patron with a mental disability, he is thanked
with an insult from the guy he is defending—“Hey! I don’t need you fighting my battles
for me fag.”
David is upset by the exchange and is later banned from the gym for punching the
guy, who also turns out to be gay; however, the guy that called him a fag is allowed to
remain a member because there are no rules against using the word in the gym. David
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shows up to a doctor’s appointment with Goldie and Bryan to hear the baby’s heartbeat.
Goldie confesses that she heard the man at the outlet store, but she is ashamed that she
did not do anything or say anything in response.
Goldie: I pretended I didn’t hear when that guy said you were disgusting for being
gay parents, but I did hear . . . I should have marched up and confronted them,
but I was too afraid.
Bryan: It’s OK.
Goldie: No, it’s not OK. And the next time that happens, I promise I’ll speak up.
If only these ignorant people with all this hate in their hearts could see you like I
do.
Bryan: Did you just intentionally quote a song from cabaret to lift my spirits, or
was that a well-timed accident?
The issues for Goldie and for David and Bryan are that they see their love like everyone
else’s love—gay or straight—and the issue is that if others would not see them as sexual
objects, but as two people who love each other and want nothing more to raise a child
together then they would not have so much “hate in their hearts.” Bryan and David come
to terms with the issue at the end of the episode when David decides to let “more joy” in
his life:
David: I need to learn to let joy in my life. All the negative stuff, the fear it’s all I
know. Like, in med school, they teach you to only look for the bad parts in things.
The exceptions, not the rules . . . We’ll never be out of the woods. There will
always be something. I hate that all the tough stuff a kid faces in life will be even
tougher for our kid because he or she will have two dads. So even though it’s not
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going to be easy, I need to try to celebrate the wins. Like, when we heard that
heartbeat yesterday, I don’t think I have ever loved you more, because that . . .
that was the sound of our family.
David’s realization is a reflection of the overall message of the marriage equality/family
movement within in the gay rights movement. The message that LGBTQ people should
be happy with what they have and change things when they can, but the overall path to
happiness and self-fulfillment is through family, marriage, and children. In other words,
enjoy the “wins” like being able to get married and have children.
Both examples can be read using the dominant codes of the marriage equality
movement, which promote an equality of sameness. Duggan (2003) argues that an
equality of sameness is a part of the neoliberal, assimilationist politics began in the
1990s. Although there appeared to be some success in the movement, she claims it was
mostly aimed at “assimilated, gender appropriate, politically mainstream portions of the
gay population” (p. 44). The “preferred” reading posits that gay couples are like straight
couples. They have their ups and downs, their struggles and disappointments, but in the
end they are no different from straight men and women. An “oppositional” reading of the
two scenarios reveals an underlying theme of sex shaming. The two couples’ happiness is
dependent upon their ability to look like everyone else, which means their ability to
suppress their sexuality, where queer sex is invisible, and romantic love is what makes
them the same, a recreation of heterosexual love.
The next two examples avoid the discussion of sexuality in a broader sense, and
instead, focus on marriage equality as an inalienable right, which has been fought for by
generations of gay men for centuries. This creation of queer memory is lost on many in
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the queer community because it lacks the “institutions for common memory and
generational transmission around which straight culture is built” (Warner, 1999, pp. 5152). He claims, “Every new wave of queer youths picks up something from its
predecessors but also invents itself from scratch . . . And since the most painfully
instructed generation has been decimated by death, the queer culture of the present faces
more than the usual shortfall in memory” (p. 52). Given this shortfall in queer memory,
the struggle for marriage is historicized in a broader LGBTQ fight for social justice.
Characters from all five shows often refer to marriage equality or marriage rights as a
struggle that has been a part of larger gay rights movement for generations, when in
actuality it only began in the late 1990s.
Rewriting History
In the final two episodes of the fourth season of Glee, ABC musical comedy show
that in 2012 was in its fourth season, Blaine, one of the gay teen members of the fictional
glee club, plans to propose marriage to Kurt, his partner who is a college student in New
York. Blaine first mentions the idea of gay marriage in episode 21 when he not only
alludes to new marriage laws in New York, where both he and Kurt will be attending
college the next year, but also later in the same episode when he asks Kurt’s dad, Burt,
for Kurt’s hand in marriage:
Burt: Anderson, you wanted to see me? You’re not going to sing to me, too, are
you?
Blaine: I just wanted to give you this. [He hands Burt a jewelry box] You can
open it. [Burt opens the box to reveal a rainbow lapel pin.] I thought you could
wear it at work to show support for gay marriage.
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Burt: Oh, it’s really sweet of you. Gay rights has been my top issue, even though
it makes me wildly unpopular with my distinguished colleagues. They’re on the
wrong side of history, so screw ‘em.
Blaine: I am so glad that you feel that way, because assuming that we legally can,
um, I wanted to formally ask for your permission to ask Kurt to marry me.
Burt: You kidding, or are you nuts?
Blaine: Kurt is my soul mate. I know that I’ve hurt him badly, but I also know
that if I want to get him back, I have to do something bold.
Burt: Blaine, it means a lot to me that you love Kurt, and you know, you’re been
like family to me . . .
Blaine: So you’re saying that you’re OK with me asking for his hand?
Burt: Of, of course not. No, you’re still kids. Did you learn anything from Finn
and Rachel? [A reference to a heterosexual couple whose high school engagement
failed shortly after their graduation from high school.]
Blaine: They are completely different. Completely different. I don’t think you
understand how it feels to finally be able to legally get married.
Burt: And you don’t really get what it is to be married. Straight, gay, whatever.
It’s not the same as living together. Blaine, listen, let’s sit down for a second.
Seriously, come here. Look, I can’t tell you why, but something happens when
you exchange vows. It’s a big deal. It’s why getting divorced is so much harder
than breaking up. There’s just a really big difference between marrying a person
and marrying an idea.
Blaine: What if he meets someone else?
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Burt: Do you think you two were meant to be?
Blaine: Yes.
Burt: Do you think you two have a true love?
Blaine: Yes.
Burt: Then stop worrying.
Blaine: I’ve got to go.
Burt: Thanks for the pin.
Blaine: Sure.
Burt: Hey it’s gonna be OK.
Blaine: How do you know that though? When two people love each other like you
two do everything works out.
Blaine refers to hurting Kurt in this scene. He had sex with another guy from Ohio at the
beginning of the season, which caused a break up between he and Kurt. The marriage is a
way for him to right his transgressions and show Kurt, and everyone else, that he is
committed to and in love with Kurt. The only way to atone for the transgressions of
casual sex and non-monogamy is to settle down and get married—to mimic their straight
friends who have either had marriage proposals or weddings. Through his romantic
gesture he will right the wrong and normalize his relationship with Kurt. His
homonormative romantic relationship has credence then not through a freedom to express
his sexuality and sexual desire, but by his ability to build and maintain a public romantic
relationship with only one other man.
Blaine continues to search for a straight ally in his proposal plans with Kurt. He
seeks Sam, one of the straight identifying glee students, whom he once had a sexual
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attraction to. Sam is Blaine’s best friend, who sees Blaine’s attraction to him as a form of
flattery, but not something that he would want to pursue sexually:
Blaine: You can only do this once, so it-it has to be perfect. It has to be, you
know, special.
Sam: Are you actually talking about a marriage proposal? Dude, we’re in high
school. You’re not ready to get married, and I’m not letting you.
Blaine: Well, I’m not asking for your permission. I’m already gonna do it. What
I’m asking for is your help about how to do this. From my best friend.
Sam: OK. Then as your best friend, I need to remind you that just a few weeks
ago, you were totally confused. You didn’t even know where Kurt stood with this
Adam guy.
Blaine: Well, I don’t remember you being this introspective when you were
asking Brittany to marry you.
Sam: One, I don’t even know what that means, and two, we thought the world
was ending. And when we realized it wasn’t I regretted it.
Blaine: Will you listen to yourself? You sound exactly like the rest of the world,
saying that ‘it’s not time yet.’ Well, you know what? People like me have been
hearing that for hundreds and hundreds of years. This is happening. I am gonna
ask Kurt to marry me. And not only are you one of my best friends, but I was kind
of hoping that you would be my best man. So let me know if you uh change your
mind.
Blaine takes another straight friend to help him find an engagement ring for Kurt. During
the shopping trip, Kurt meets a lesbian, Jan, who has been with her partner, Liz, for more

	
  

62
than thirty years. Jan finally gives Blaine the confirmation he needs to pursue his plans to
propose to Kurt. Jan tells Blaine that if all gays and lesbians had listened to people telling
them to wait for marriage then “we wouldn’t be moments away from the Supreme Court
finally telling us that we are just as crazy and awesome as everybody else” (Episode 22).
She also asks Blaine if he and Kurt have any gay or lesbian role models that they can turn
to for advice before she asked him to meet her and Liz for dinner.
Jan and Liz describes their relationship for Kurt and Blaine during dinner, which
also reveals a larger gay and lesbian history, which includes the struggle for acceptance
and sameness:
Jan: It was love at first sticks [name of the band they saw playing and the
restaurant they are currently eating at] that’s what we always say.
Liz: Well, the irony was that we met at the concert you know. We grew up in the
same town just a few blocks from each other.
Blaine: Wow
Liz: We went to the same high school.
Kurt: You guys are like a Nora Ephron movie.
Liz: Exactly
Blaine: Did you go to prom together?
Jan: No
Liz: Yeah
Jan: Well, we went together as a group. We took boys, of course. Merle and
Tommy, those poor fools.
Liz: Merle and Tom
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Jan: They had no idea what was going on.
Liz: It was different times then, you know. There were, there were no gay clubs at
school. You know, nobody talked about it. We had no representation.
Jan: But somehow we always found a way. That summer we went on a bus tour of
the United States. We saw the sights. And in the end we decided we liked Ohio
the best.
Liz. Yeah, yeah, came back, moved in together, got each other through college,
and we broke up
Jan: Twice
Liz: and got back together again
Jan: Twice. And then we bought the house in Lima.
Liz: What haven’t we seen from our porch?
Jan: Nothing.
Liz: Hmm
Jan: AIDS
Liz: Yea
Jan: Don’t ask, don’t tell
Jan: Ellen
Jan: We’ve seen it all side-by-side. Remember when we couldn’t even do this in
public, hold hands? . . .
Kurt: . . . it’s great and really inspiring to hear your story. You know, I know I
don’t, and we don’t really have too many gay and lesbian role models to look up
to, so
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Later in the scene Jan asks Liz to marry her. She announces that she wants to get married
as soon as possible and waiting is not necessary because there are plenty of places in
where it is legal right now. The final scene of the episode, which is also the final scene of
the season, shows Blaine holding a ring box behind his back as he and other glee club
students watch the wedding of their teacher, Will Shuster, and guidance counselor, Emma
Gerber. The episodes work to historicize gay marriage into a larger struggle for gay
rights, but also to argue for an equality of sameness via romantic love.
Throughout the two episodes Blaine references an altered queer memory for a
new generation of gays and lesbians that includes a long struggle for marriage equality
without real mention of other human rights issues or sexuality in general. An
“oppositional” reading of Blaine’s argument examines his use of a symmetrical civil
rights discourse that promotes equality through sameness and a homonormative concept
of marriage via romance and love. Blaine’s argument is given credence by an older
lesbian couple, Liz and Jan, who have lived through several milestones in the gay rights
community. Hume (2002) argues, “Each era uses public memory to suit its own needs,
but those memories are by definition built on historical, cultural building blocks, each
representing another era’s needs and cultural norms” (p. 46). Blaine’s memory of
marriage equality stretches past the last 25 years into a struggle that he described as one
that has taken hundreds and hundreds of years to overcome. This memory looks beyond
the political and social arguments for same-sex marriage and never once mentions a
struggle for sexual or gender equality. The show uses the young coupling of Blaine, a
high school senior, and Kurt, a college freshman, as the impetus for the site of the
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memory, a memory that skirts around a broader sense of civil rights and emphasizes
marriage as a basic human right.
Similarly, the sixth episode of The New Normal works to position gay marriage as
a struggle for the expression of romantic love not a struggle for sexual freedom.
However, the New Normal episode works to achieve this argument by dispelling
arguments that work to oppose marriage equality. The episode, titled “Bryanzilla,”
centers on a pretend wedding for Shania and one of her classmates. The pretend wedding
is an analogy for gay weddings. Opposition to the pretend childhood wedding mimic the
arguments against same-sex weddings and marriage. Also interspersed in the episode is
an allusion to a common gay objection to same-sex marriage that plays out between
David and Bryan.
In this episode, Shania, Goldie’s daughter, announces her pretend engagement to
a boy in her class, Wilbur. Bryan decides to plan and host the wedding at his and David’s
house—complete with catered food, gifts, cakes, and attire, just like a “real” wedding.
The wedding episode is an attempt to show multiple sides to the marriage equality debate
via the analogy of a child wedding, which is presented from the outset as a “pretend
wedding.” The most viable argument presented in the debate is in favor of gay marriage
as a right to express love in whatever way is deemed appropriate and necessary by the
two people in love. This is shown through Bryan, who wants to marry David, and Shania
and Wilbur, who want to “pretend marry” each other. The other sides of the argument are
shown to be either ridiculous or absurd. The arguments are seen through Jane’s religious
rhetoric, which castigates Shania’s pretend marriage and David and Bryan’s relationship
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and hypothetical marriage as well as David’s reluctance to get married if it is not legally
binding and legitimate or, in his view, necessary.
Bryan and David discuss the merits of gay marriage with flashbacks to earlier
times in their relationships. During one of their early dates, Bryan and David discusses
the possibility of one day getting married:
Bryan: I want to get married someday and live happily ever after, don’t you?
David: Sure, I also want to be a seven-foot-tall center for the Chicago Bulls, but
that’s not gonna happen.
Bryan: I don’t know what that means.
David: Marriage for guys like us, it’s a fantasy. Gay people can have fabulous
commitment ceremonies, but until it’s sanctioned by the U.S. government, it’s
nothing more than just playing house.
Bryan: Yeah but emotions are real. I mean it’s still a declaration of love.
David: Until every single consenting adult in this country can marry whomever
they choose, I refuse to even consider getting married.
Bryan: That’s so unromantic, but so political and Harvey Milk hot. Um, OK, so
marriage is off the table. What about kids?
David: That, I’d be interested in with the right guy.
Bryan and David’s differing opinions are made more apparent later in the episode when
Jane attacks Shania’s pretend wedding and the idea of gay weddings. The difference of
opinion and value are set as a stumbling block, not only for Bryan and David in their
relationship but for the marriage equality movement as a whole—if gay people cannot
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agree on the future of marriage equality and the outcome best for the community, then
anti-gay opponents will win:
David: Bryan, Shania is a nine-year-old girl with a crush. If she wanted a fantasy
playground wedding, I get it, but not everyone wants what you want. This is
becoming the social event of the season.
Bryan: Oh, from your lips. Do the Kardashians have any school-age children?
Jane: Can someone please explain to me what the hell is . . .
Bryan: Oh, yeah, it’s Shania’s wedding invitation. We wanted to do a customized
presentation box, but there just wasn’t enough time. And we couldn’t agree on a
ribbon.
Jane: Why are you doing this to Shania?
Goldie: Oh, Nana, it’s just a pretend wedding.
Jane: No, see, that’s what these gays do. They “pretend” you can define what
marriage is. Today it’s two children. Tomorrow, it’s the banana polishers. Next
thing you know, they’re gonna have a wedding for their dog.
Bryan: Actually, we had a commitment ceremony for Smelly and Mabel, the
Schuler’s boxer, last spring, and the beef bouillon fountain went over big.
David: Not helping.
Jane: Marriage is not for dogs, it is not for children, and I’m sorry, boys, but it is
not for you.
Rocky: Mrs. Forrest, there was a time not too long ago, when it was illegal for
black people to marry white people.
Jane: Kept things organized.
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Bryan: When the state of California finally makes gay marriage legal, my partner
and I will be getting married, right, David? Right?
David: I don’t know.
Jane: Aw, Cinderfella. Looks like that glass slipper doesn’t fit. And this sham
wedding isn’t happening either.
David’s unwillingness to commit to marriage with Bryan becomes a point of contention
through the remainder of the episode along with the debate over Shania’s pretend
wedding. To sabotage the wedding, Jane plants a few of Shania and Wilbur’s classmates
in the audience to derail the ceremony. When Shania decided to cancel the pretend
wedding, she and Bryan are disheartened. However, the events of the day cause David to
have a change of heart regarding his relationship with Bryan. David takes Bryan to his
office as a surprise to propose to him with Goldie present:
Bryan: Why are we here? You promised me dumplings.
David: There’s something I have to do. It’ll only take a minute.
Bryan: I don’t like being in your office after dark. It feels like there are ghosts.
Ghosts of patients who couldn’t understand their co-pay and died talking to their
insurance company.
Goldie: Hi, Bryan. Pretend like I’m not here.
David: There’s something I want to ask you, and I could only do it like this.
Bryan: David, stop it. What’s going on? Just give me a minute.
David: [to Goldie] You doing OK?
Goldie: Yeah, I’m great. You do you.
David: There. Hold it right there [while holding a the sonogram wand].
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Bryan: Oh, David. David, look, you can see his or her tiny, little fingers. What are
you doing? Is it my birthday.
David: I wanted to do it like this, in front of our baby, so that one day, he or she
could say, ‘I was there. I was there when my daddies got engaged.’ There was
this, uh, moment at Shania’s fake wedding when I looked over at you, and the
tears in your eyes were real. I always knew how important getting married was to
you, but it wasn’t until that moment that I truly understood what commitment
meant. We’re having a baby, Bry. This is our family. You, me and that kid.
Forever. Family is the ultimate commitment. Getting married, it just seems I don’t
know, easy.
Bryan: But you don’t believe in it.
David: But you do, and I believe in us.
Bryan: Oh
David: Bryan Collins . . .
Bryan: Oh, my God, it’s happening.
David: Will you do me the honor of being my husband?
Bryan: Yes.
Marriage is presented as the logical choice for two committed adults, who want to
raise children and be in a committed relationship with one another. This argument
excludes any talk of a larger issues of acceptance of sexual or relational differences—
being gay and wanting a same-sex marriage is the “different” relationship referred to in
the analogy of the “pretend” child wedding of Shania and Wilbur. Just as the “pretend
wedding” may have been absurd to some, the idea of two people wanting to express
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themselves in a way that is different from the norm is, by contrast, logical. Thus, any
argument in opposition to same-sex marriages is absurd, whether it is from anti-gay
opponents or queer objectors.
Summary
This chapter is an attempt to illuminate the arguments presented in favor of samesex marriage in primetime sitcoms, which either shame queer sexuality via
heteronormative expectations of private sexuality or symbolically annihilating queer
sexuality in favor of homonormative conceptions of romantic love. Sexual shaming
forces queer individuals to adopt a relationship that resembles the heterosexist,
patriarchal structure, which includes a dominant/submissive dichotomy and a privatized
sexuality. Shaming serves to stifle a queer sexuality, which may work to transgress
heteronormative relational dynamics like monogamy, coupling, and private sex.
Relationships presented in these programs avoid appearing too far outside the norm, and
sometimes work to outwardly duck heterosexual fears of open gay sex or queer sexuality
by disavowing sexual promiscuity or multiple-partner relationships. Shaming also works
to push those who do not fit the heteronormative model further to the margins of society
by presenting those who conform as worthy of social justice and civil rights. Those who
do not conform are then presented as an “other”—an embarrassment to the good gays
who have been civilized by domestic heteronormativity.
Similarly, the homonormative concept of romantic love works to symbolically
annihilate the bad queer from primetime television. Narratives that do not attempt to
shame queer sexuality often avoid the conversation of sexuality all together. Instead, they
argue from an ahistorical memory of same-sex marriage as a part of a broader gay rights
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movement, or work toward a politics of sameness whereas gay and lesbian couples fight
for rights via romantic love that is the same as the romantic love sought after by straight
couples. By historicizing the marriage equality movement within a wider and older gay
rights movement, the programs are able to help construct a site of queer memory where
marriage has been a goal of gay men and women for centuries. In actuality, the
movement for same-sex marriage is a phenomenon of the last couple of decades. The
queer memory also relies on the construct of romantic love as an equalizing power
whereby gay and lesbian couples are entitled to the same rights and privileges as their
straight counterparts.
Just as sex shaming works to further marginalize those who fall outside of the
heteronormative sexual model, the homonormative fight for marriage equality works to
further privilege those who fit the homonormative by bestowing the privileges associated
with marriage in the United States. In other words, privilege is usually bestowed to white,
gay men in monogamous relationships that resemble heteronormative and
homonormative relational standards. Often those at the intersection of sexuality, gender,
race, and class are not given entrance into either the heteronormative or homonormative
and are, consequently, denied the privileges associated with both. These intersections will
be discussed further in the next two chapters with a discussion of race, gender, and class
as they intersect with sexuality and gay identity.
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CHAPTER IV
GAY = WHITE MAN
The U.S. ‘gay community’ is a primarily white community despite its claims and
efforts to be more inclusive. It projects whiteness through a projection of an
image of normalcy which is inherently a white image.
—Niels Teunis (2007, p. 268)
The implications for women are that sexism is cast as only a vestige of
conventionally defined straight men, suggesting that sexist practices by gay
men—or less rigidly masculine men—’don’t count,’ thus renormalizing sexism
under a host of ‘exceptional’ circumstances. The implications for gay men are that
the price of privilege is sexism, a fact that necessarily defines them by their
heteronormative sexual relationships with women. The gay men in these
configurations thus become patriarchal allies—rather than adversaries—in efforts
to naturalize and reproduce heteronormative politics.
—Helene A. Shugart (2003, p. 89)
University of Mississippi student Sierra Mannie caused a raucous debate among
many white gay bloggers and readers in early July 2014 with an opinion piece posted on
the Daily Mississippian online, later posted on Time.com, titled “Dear white gays: Stop
stealing black female culture” (Mannie, 2014 para. 1). In the piece, Mannie argues white
gay men often appropriate the stereotyped culture of black women by adopting racist
dialectical, physical, and affectional characteristics of black women. Mannie contends:
I need some of you to cut it the hell out. Maybe, for some of you, it’s a presumed
similar appreciation for Beyoncé and weave that has you thinking that I’m going
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to be amused by you approaching me in your best ‘Shanequa from around the
way’ voice. I don’t know. What I do know is that I don’t care how well you can
quote Madea, who told you that your booty was getting bigger than hers, how cute
you think it is to call yourself a strong black woman, who taught you to twerk,
how funny you think it is to call yourself Quita or Keisha or for which black male
you’ve been bottoming — you are not a black woman, and you do not get to
claim either blackness or womanhood. It is not yours. It is not for you. (Mannie,
2014 para. 1)
Mannie tells readers to check their privilege and be part of the solution rather than
continuing the “foolery” of acting the part of a “strong black woman . . . or a ghetto girl”
(Mannie, 2014 para. 13). However adept many of Mannie’s observations and arguments
may have been, many white, gay bloggers responded, in many instances, with vitriol and
condemnation.
One commenter on one such response post claimed gay, white men are not
afforded white privilege, and, thus, are not complicit in perpetuating white dominance
and oppression over racial and gender minorities. Another blogger, published on
Huffington Post more than a week after Mannie’s commentary first appeared,
appropriately notes Mannie’s argument, while correct in the way of racial appropriation,
ventures into transphobic territory by privileging cisgender identity (D’Agostino, 2014).
D’Agostino contends Mannie’s piece works to legitimize “gender normative rhetoric that
de-legitimizes gay men and trans-women.” (D’Agostino, 2014 para. 3). D’Agostino
argues:
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Some men are as authentically feminine as some women. And some feminine
men who are white grow up around black people who are feminine, so, yeah, their
femininity might seem a little "black" to you. Really not their fault. Really none
of your business. This is to say, your heterodominant feminist fantasy of owning
"womanhood" is not the reality of queer people or feminine men. Femininity is
theirs also and it is not for you to allow or deny their gender expression.
(D’Agostiono, 2014 para. 5)
However, D’Agostiono’s (2014) argument does not fully adhere to his earlier admission
that appropriation of black culture is damaging and the product of white privilege.
Instead, D’Agostino provides an escape plan for those white gay men, who do not fully
adhere to gender norms, from their privilege, thus, legitimizing white, gay racial
appropriation and sexism via exclusion from the hetero-dominant culture. By excluding
white, gay men from the broader scope of white privilege, he allows a space for them
within black womanhood—supporting the argument made by Mannie.
The exclusion of white, gay men from white, male privilege is not a new concept.
For decades, white gay men have operated from the assumption that their sexual minority
status excludes them from dominant forms of oppression and privilege; however,
previous researchers have pointed to the dangers of viewing sexual minority status as an
exclusionary factor in racism and sexism (Johnson, 2003; King, 2009; Nero, 2005;
Shugart, 2003; Stone & Ward, 2011; Ward, 1999; Ward, 2008; Yep & Elia, 2012). In this
chapter, I will discuss how white gay characters in primetime network television shows
are given a pass from white male privilege. This pass comes not only by way of their
sexual minority status but also through the symbolic annihilation of people belonging to
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intersections of race, gender, and sexuality. White gay men then stand-in as a
representation of all sexually queer people despite race and/or gender identity, which
works to further privilege white men and subordinate women and people of color. First, I
provide a brief discussion of white male privilege before discussing previous literature on
race, gender, and sexuality. Finally, I analyze several examples from the programs
included in this study to illustrate how whiteness and maleness are privileged.
White Male Privilege
Any discussion of white male privilege should include a discussion of the
invisible and imbalanced nature of privilege. Carbado (2005) concludes there are two
categories of male privilege about which men should develop awareness. First, the
invisible advantages that men can count on each day without ever having to work to earn
them. The other, he argues, “includes a series of disadvantages that men do not
experience precisely because they are men” (p. 195). Men, Carbado (2005) maintains, do
not have to envision themselves as engendered because, “a white heterosexual man lives
on the white side of race, the male side of gender, and the straight side of sexual
orientation. He is, in this sense, the norm. Mankind. The baseline. He is our reference.
We are all defined with him in mind. We are the same as or different from him” (p. 192).
However, Carbado (2005) argues, not all men experience and enjoy the same advantages
to an equal level.
Men at the intersection of race, gender identity, and sexual orientation must
contend with other factors that negatively affect their privilege because those men must
“simultaneously contend with and respond to negative identity signification. That is, we
simultaneously live with and contest our nonnormativitiy. We are ‘different,’ and our
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identities have negative social meanings” (Carbado, 2005 p 193). Thus, he contends,
listing all male privileges is problematic because a universal manhood does not exist, and
constructing such a universal would obscure or trivialize those men outside the white,
middle class, heterosexual construction of manhood. Further, he argues that class, race,
and sexual orientation impact male identities and may either limit or expand their
privilege.
Race, Sexuality, and Privilege
Despite the limitations of nonnormative gender, racial, and sexual identities,
much of the rhetoric of the gay rights movement works to eliminate difference and relies
on a narrative of sameness whereby sexuality trumps other identities. Yep and Elia
(2012) argue the “new homonormativity” relies on the hegemonic view of racism as a
thing of the past, and reduces any instance of oppression or discrimination as a product of
homophobia, not a combination of sexuality, race, gender performance and class. By
focusing solely on homophobia, only the concerns of white queers are reflected. They
contend, “Queers of color cannot afford to ignore how their ‘other’ differences interplay
with their sexuality” (p. 899) because those difference are salient in day-to-day life.
Stone and Ward (2011) argue that “Blackness” has been used by whites on both
sides of the “modern gay rights discourse” to help forward their own causes and
arguments (p. 606), especially for white pro-gay rights activists during much of the
movement’s history. They claim these activists have “relied on Blackness as the
dominant metaphor for difference, victimization, and resistance, or as a rhetorical device
to achieve specific political ends, such as mobilizing voters, coalition building, or
discrediting their opposition” (p. 606). Stone and Ward (2011) also claim the vernacular
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of the gay rights movement reflects white privilege. For example, they argue, concepts
such as “the closet,” “coming out,” “lifestyle,” and “sexual identity” are “rooted in white,
middle-class, and American conceptualizations of the relationship between self,
sexuality, and community, thereby rendering the same-sex desires and queer
subjectivities of people of color unintelligible or invisible within US queer politics” (pp.
606-607). In other words, most people of color are eliminated from the discourse of the
gay rights movement via privileged language.
Teunis (2007) argues the “gay community” in the United States is predominantly
a white community regardless of the claims that it is more inclusive. He contends “It
projects whiteness through a projection of an image of normalcy which is inherently a
white image” (p. 268). By aligning the movement with a broader normalized society (i.e.,
white, middle class, and heterosexual), gay rights activists and members of the white gay
community are able to gain access to social institutions and spaces not previously
available to them because of their sexuality. For example, the movement’s push for
marriage equality is generally led by white men and women, according to Teunis, “who
display little or no concern for critical political issues that face gays and lesbians of
color” (p. 269). He argues the issues do not cause the promotion of whiteness inherently.
Whiteness, he claims, is given dominance by the way the issues are promoted, which
overshadows other issues within the larger LGBTQ community.
Coopting Blackness
In general, race has been used in the modern gay rights movement as a model for
gaining particular rights and privileges that, more than anything, benefit white gay and
lesbian members. The discussion of race is subordinated by the discussion of sexuality
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and gay identity. However, racial issues have often served as a talking point for anti-gay
and lesbian rhetoric since the beginning of the modern gay rights movement. Stone and
Ward (2011) claim the anti-gay campaigns resemble white segregationists movements
during the 1960s black Civil Rights Movement. Principally white religious conservatives,
who traditionally opposed racial justice causes, led the groups. In recent years, they have
attempted to build a coalition with Blacks by pitting gay rights versus black rights. Stone
and Ward argue that while the gay rights focus has shifted in the 2000s to military service
and marriage rights, “they [gay rights activists] have taken up direct analogies between
gayness and blackness that have fuelled white racism in the movement, and reinforced
the white construction of homosexuality” (p. 608). Further, white anti-gay conservatives,
during this same period, framed their cause as a fight to protect children against sexual
immorality and/or sexual assault, which “prompted gay activists to work at humanizing
LGBT people by drawing parallels to other historically maligned and oppressed groups
(Jews, interned Japanese Americans, ‘ Third World People,’ women and working class
people)” (p. 608).
In contrast, anti-gay white leaders, according to Stone and Ward, work to
demonstrate their solidarity with black voters by dismantling connections or comparisons
between the black rights movement and the gay rights movement even though this
connection works to obscure queer people of color, enfeeble arguments for affirmative
action, and coopt black civil rights as a rhetorical weapon for causes and groups with no
interests in furthering black civil rights. They argue that the deployment of race by the
religious right and gay and lesbian activists suggests that both are similar in their
willingness to cite race in troublesome ways. Gay rights activists, as a result of co-opting
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black civil rights rhetoric, exclude LGBTQ people of color from the gay rights narrative.
This marginalization translates to symbolic annihilation in the mass media, a process by
which the mass media ignore, exclude, marginalize, or trivialize a group of people via
exclusion from its products (Klein & Shiffman, 2009). In other words, exclusion from the
work of the “gay community” leads to exclusion from media portrayals of the “gay
community,” and, thus, exclusion from the dominant culture, which, in turn, leads to
further marginalization and trivialization.
Symbolically Annihilating LGBTQ People of Color
Teunis (2007) argues that whiteness in the gay community “is visible, palpable, if
for no other reason than that images of men of color are absent” (p. 269). He references a
study in which he examines all issues of Out magazine from 2002. He claims men of
color are only featured in one of two sections. Teunis maintains, “First, Latino gay men
are represented only as musicians, whose work is reviewed in the appropriate pages.
Second, black men model the peak of health in advertisements for HIV treatment drugs”
(pp. 269-270). He further argues the “gay community” has benefited from symbolically
annihilating LGBTQ people of color in several ways. First, he concludes that the
portrayal of whiteness has been used to lend to the gay community an air of
respectability, and the that the portrayal of whiteness lends to the myth of the affluent gay
male, which will be discussed further in Chapter V.
Nero (2005) argues that racism and homophobia keep black gay men invisible or
marginal in American film and television. He contends that the dual dominant ideological
beliefs that African American males are hyper-masculine, and cannot be gay, and
“America’s homophobic preoccupation with white masculinity” and how it produces
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same-sex attraction black gay men are not granted a space—black gay men “cannot
exist” (p. 235). Nero adds, “Like the controlling images of black women as mammy,
jezebel, and welfare queen, the ubiquitous image of the black gay male as an impostor or
a fraud naturalizes and normalizes the exclusion of black gay men from sites of territorial
economies where wealth is created” (p. 235). By casting black gay men as imposters or
frauds in television programing, Nero contends, black gay men are then excluded from
participation in queer cultures, which “reveals white hostility toward black gay men” (p.
240). This exclusion he argues is participation in an “unspoken pact to keep blacks on the
bottom,” a concept introduced by Bell (1992) in Faces at the Bottom of the Well. Bell
argues, “Americans achieve a measure of social stability through their unspoken pact to
keep blacks on the bottom—as aspect of social functioning that more than any other has
retained its viability and its value to general stability from the very beginning of the
American experience down to the present day” (p. 152).
The unspoken pact referenced by Nero could be a possible accounting of
perceived homophobia from the African American community directed toward white gay
men. Teunis (2007) maintains the resistance by the white gay community to integrate
race into the discussion of sexuality, “makes White gay men blind to the possibility that
the perceived homophobia in African American communities is very race specific. If a
gay identity is a white identity, which it is in the eyes of many though certainly not all
African Americans, then homophobia is also directed towards white gay men, who are
perceived to be wealthy, and therefore part of the problem rather than part of the solution
of racial inequality” (p. 270). The next section of this chapter discusses a specific
example of symbolic annihilation of queer people of color, and how it was openly
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discussed in the programs examined for this study. I also discuss the coopted ethnic
minority language used in the programs to, in some ways, place sexual identity on par
with racial and ethnic identity.
Acknowledging Invisibility
The symbolic annihilation of people of color broadly and LGBTQ people of color
more specifically is not only a theme seen throughout this study, but the invisibility of
people of color also becomes the topic of a at least one episode of The New Normal. In
episode four of The New Normal, titled “Obama Mama,” Bryan and David acknowledge
and come to terms with their whitewashed world. In an effort to prove to Jane, the
socially conservative mother of their surrogate, they not only preach diversity, but they
also practice diversity in their everyday lives, the couple hosted a dinner party for Jane
and all of their “black friends.” The episode begins with a discussion among Bryan,
David, and Goldie, the couple’s surrogate, about the upcoming election—the 2012
Presidential Election. Bryan and David are upset at the prospect of Goldie voting for Mitt
Romney and try to convince her to vote for Obama—their candidate of choice. Jane, a
long-time Republican, confronted David and Bryan about their protests:
Jane: You stay out of my granddaughter‘s head! I put years into shaping it, and I
will not have you left-wing Nancy boys poisoning her with your hug-a-Muslim
bull crap!
David: Mrs. Forrest, what a disturbing surprise.
Jane: I will have you know that my family has voted Republican since Abraham
Lincoln, the freer of the slaves. I am proud of my party, and I have been a
supporter since 1972.
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[Flashback to 1972]
Protestors: No more war!
Young Jane: Dick Nixon knows how to keep America strong! That‘s why I like
dick. Who is with me? I like dick! I like dick!
[Back to present]
Bryan: Oh, so we have you to thank for Watergate and Reagan and Bush and
Baby Bush.
Jane: Oh, honey, even we don‘t like the bushes anymore.
David: But you’re voting for Mitt Romney, which is the equivalent of saying the
poor aren‘t entitled to health care, or the environment doesn‘t need protecting.
Jane: Mitt Romney is interested in preserving every American‘s right to make his
or her own choices.
Bryan: Unless you‘re gay.
Jane: I thought gay wasn’t a choice. You’ve already polluted Goldie’s womb with
your gay sperms. Leave her vote alone.
Bryan: You know what I think this is about? Obama is black, and you don’t like
anybody who‘s not like you.
Jane: Oh, I would slap your face right now if I didn‘t want to get a handful of man
makeup.
Bryan: It is tinted sunscreen! I’m just gonna say it. Mrs. Forrest, I believe you are
a racist.
Jane: Why is that the place that all you liberals go to? Just because I don‘t like a
man who wants to take my hard-earned money and dump it into a broken system,
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I’m a racist? Don’t you think it’s a little more racist to vote for a black man
simply because he‘s black? And what about you two? I don’t imagine you‘re
lighting candles on Kwanzaa. Couple of hypocrites. Like every other liberal, you
talk the talk, but you can‘t walk the walk.
Bryan: That is not true! We have black friends. We have oodles of them!
Jane: Right.
Bryan: We do, and if you don‘t believe me, you can come to our party on Friday
night, and you can meet them for yourself.
David: Mmm
Jane: Great. I‘ll see you and all your homies on Friday.
[Jane leaves]
Bryan: Great!
David: So, we‘re having a party?
Bryan: Yup. Know any black people?
Later in the episode, Bryan and David discusses their social circle during a scene in their
bedroom. The two come to the realization that they have no black friends, and aside from
one doctor friend of David’s, who is Indian, they have few friends of color.
Bryan: Mrs. Forrest is right. We are phony, liberal frauds. We are racists!
David: We can‘t be. We are two educated, successful, enlightened gay men.
Bryan: I guess we can‘t be held entirely responsible. We do meet a lot of black
people.
David: Right.
Bryan: We see them at work.
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David: Uh-uh.
Bryan: We run into them at parties, except for our own. I mean, is it our fault that
none of them stick?
David: Yeah, using the pejorative “them” is not helping our case.
Bryan: We have to get some black people to come to our party. I will not be
called a bigoted, armchair liberal by anyone. Maybe we could get the cast of
Tremé to come. I sat next to them at the Golden Globes last year, and since
nobody watches that show anyway, they could easily pass as your run-of-the-mill,
non-famouses.
In an attempt to have black people at his party, Bryan invites Rocky, his employee and
only regular character of color on the program, to the party and encourages her to bring
along her friends, thinking all of her friends would be black. During the party, Bryan and
David work frantically to present a diverse front for Jane; however, the lack of diversity
in their social circle become more apparent than before. Rocky arrives at the party with a
group of white friends, and Bryan hires one of the waiters, an actor, to pretend to be their
other black friend. The only other guest of color is Rocky’s brother, who Bryan and
David has never met and who is revealed to be a Republican during the dinner party.
David and Bryan are forced to come to the realization that they have little diversity in
their social circle. At the end of the episode, Bryan and David along with Goldie vow to
work on widening their social circles in an effort to provide a more diverse environment
for their child.
David: You know, it would be nice to have more diversity in our lives if not for
us, for the baby.
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Bryan: It‘s true. Growing up with two white dads. I mean, how much travel and
culture and dance can one kid take?
David: I‘m serious.
Bryan: I know, I know, and I agree. I mean, we talk the talk, but we don’t always
walk the walk.
David: Not a word to your grandmother.
Bryan: We will deny it, I swear.
Goldie: You know, it’s never too late. Come on.
[Goldie walked to a bi-racial couple, Asian woman and black man, during a
school function for her daughter.]
Um, hi, I‘m Goldie, Shania’s mom.
Renee: I‘m Renee. This is my husband Joe and our son Matthew.
David: So, how far along are you?
Renee: Almost six months.
Goldie: Oh, congratulations. I’m not showing yet but, um, I‘m pregnant, too.
Joe: Oh, congratulations to you.
Goldie: Oh, well, thank um, actually it’s, it’s not my baby. It’s theirs. I‘m their
surrogate.
Renee: You know, we‘ve done this before. If you have questions about being
first-time parents, we should have dinner sometime.
Bryan: Uh, we would love that.
David: Yeah, that‘d be great.
Renee: Cool.

	
  

86
David: Nice meeting you.
Bryan: See you.
Joe: This is perfect. We were just saying we need some gay friends.
David and Bryan’s realization that they have a racially homogenous social circle,
in a “preferred” reading of the episode, is a testament the potential growth for enlightened
and educated gay men. For that matter, white people of all sexualities and genders. The
episode provides a feel good story that begins with the internal struggles of two men, who
are forced to come to terms with their own potential biases and ends with the two men
feeling better about themselves because they make an effort to acquire new, diverse
friends. However, the two never acknowledge or own their white male privilege or racist
behavior. In an “oppositional” reading, the episode is fraught with racist behaviors from
nearly all of the white characters.
The first exchange between David and Bryan and Jane, Goldie’s mother, is an
example of the co-opting of race by both sides of the gay rights movement. Jane uses the
argument of liberal racism while Bryan and David accuse Jane of being a racist because
of her political affiliations and stance on issues like marriage equality. Jane actually never
mentions race until David accuses her of being a racist, which he claims to be her reason
for not voting for President Obama. The couple seems to equate racism with being in
opposition to gay rights, which connotes a gay claim to a racial minority status on equal
footing with racial civil rights movements. Bryan and David also consider themselves
impervious to racism because they are both educated, successful, enlightened gay men.
The couple acknowledges racism but only the overt racism that they saddle Jane with in
the opening of the episode. However, Bryan and David wield a more systemic and covert
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type of racism—one born from privilege and a refusal to face head on the results of that
privilege.
Though David and Bryan’s privilege is evident in nearly every aspect of the
program (i.e., their home, their jobs, their employees, their friends), it is never the topic
of discussion in this particular episode. The fact that the only “black friends” the two of
them have are their employees never becomes a topic of real conversation. Bryan and
David’s “black friends” and potential future “black friends” are presented more as
possessions—something to boast about or to own. Also interesting is that none of these
current or potential “black friends” are LGBTQ. Bryan and David never mention the
possibility of finding new LGBTQ friends of color, which suggests LGBTQ people of
color do not exist or at least do not exist in a world where two white successful, educated,
and enlightened gay men can befriend them. For all intents and purposes, LGBTQ people
of color are symbolically annihilated, not just in this episode but also in a broader sense
across the programs under study here.
Intertextually, all five programs provide a predominantly white, educated,
“enlightened” front for the gay community. With only a couple of exceptions, two minor
characters from Glee, all adult LGBTQ characters presented in the programs are white,
middle class men with few connections to people from different racial or ethnic
backgrounds. Even fewer are LGBTQ people from differing racial or ethnic backgrounds.
Aside from racial whitewashing, the representations of LGBTQ women are also sparse.
Often when women were represented, LGBTQ or otherwise, they adhered to traditional
gender roles to the point of replicating heterosexist, patriarchal relationships with gay
men. According to an annual GLAAD report (2011) on LGBTQ representations in
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television, 33% of all LGBTQ characters on primetime television are women, and 67%
are gay men, only one bisexual character was scripted for the season. The report claims
that there are no LGBTQ people of color in primetime regular or recurring roles. In other
words, the vast majority of characters representing the LGBTQ community on primetime
television are white gay men.
Gay Men and Patriarchy
Similar to arguments that exclude white gay men from racism by virtue of an
ethnic model sexual minority status, assertions that exclude gay men from the dominant
patriarchy are dangerous and misplaced. Ward (1999) argues sociologists who study gay
men and masculinity often overlook the connection of gay men and their relationship to
women in the way that the relationship between heterosexual men and women are
studied. She contends, “Sociologists of masculinity grant epistemic privilege, or special
knowledge, to gay men, considering their unique standpoint outside of heterosexual
sexual relations, or outside of men’s sexualized domination over women” (p. 153). Ward
(1999) posits the notion gay men, because they “exist outside of heterosexual relations of
gender domination, closer to moving beyond sexism than heterosexual men is
problematic because it implies that gay men are interested in the appearance of
hegemonic masculinity but are not infatuated with the political power associated with
masculine privilege” (p. 155). Ward (1999) argues that sexism becomes a way for gay
men to distance themselves from women while abiding by hegemonic norms. Although
there are other ways to illustrate or to demonstrate a non-existent sexual attraction to
women, many gay men prefer to bash women. Ward (1999) claims, however, that not all
queer sexism aimed at women from gay men is linked to heterosexual norms and
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privilege. Ward adds that gay men often are able to render women invisible because of
the absence of sexual attraction, which would then at least force some negotiation in a
sexual partnership. Ward contends that to build real alliances between gay men and
women, which is differentiated from “cultural narratives about women’s friendships with
gay men,” is to work against the presumptions that gay men are beyond sexism that they
share in the victimization from heterosexual masculinity (p. 155). She concludes that gay
men need to also fight against the notion that queer sexism is not an urgent matter in
society.
Aligning with the Patriarchy
Shugart (2003) argues that the television depictions of gay men/heterosexual
women relationships in both television and film conflate a “recoded and normalized”
male homosexuality with privileged male heterosexuality to extend heterosexual male
privilege to the gay men depicted. In doing so, she argues, “blatant sexism is reinvented
and legitimized, and gay male identity simultaneously is defined by and renormalizes
heteronormativity” (p. 67). She contends that one of the staples of the gay
man/heterosexual woman genre (e.g., Will & Grace) is the heterosexualization of the gay
male through traditionally masculine stereotypes and roles as well as the foil character
(the overly flamboyant or effeminate character that is in stark contrast to the lead gay
male character). In other words, the program adheres to a gender binary where
relationships are defined in dichotomous masculine/feminine terms. However, Shugart
claims this is only the first step to aligning the gay male character’s sexuality with the
heterosexual norm. The second step “features increased sexual access to, license with,
and paternalistic control of women, all of which accordingly reframe gay male sexuality
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as an extension of heterosexual male privilege predicated on control of female sexuality”
(p. 80).
Shurgart (2003) maintains the representations of gay men and heterosexual
women in many shows and films work as “fill-ins” for the “sexist sex that many straight
men are conditioned to idealize” (p. 88) she continues, arguing that the representations
“function not only to control female sexuality but to control gay male sexuality, as well”
(p. 88). Further, Shugart adds:
The implications for women are that sexism is cast as only a vestige of
conventionally defined straight men, suggesting that sexist practices by gay
men—or less rigidly masculine men—’don’t count,’ thus renormalizing sexism
under a host of ‘exceptional’ circumstances. The implications for gay men are that
the price of privilege is sexism, a fact that necessarily defines them by their
heteronormative sexual relationships with women. The gay men in these
configurations thus become patriarchal allies—rather than adversaries—in efforts
to naturalize and reproduce heteronormative politics. (p. 89)
The following section of this chapter provides an analysis of the relationship between
Goldie and David and Bryan from The New Normal that exhibits many of the
heteronormative opposite-sex dynamics mentioned in previous literature— gay men act
as “fill-ins” in the absence of straight men. I also analyze an episode of Modern Family
where the absence of a woman creates a replication of the gender binary between
Mitchell and Cam. The two adhere to the masculine and feminine roles prescribed by the
patriarchy.

	
  

91
The New Object
Although the creators of The New Normal aim to depict a family situation that
shows a change in “normal,” many of the relationships between the characters remain
reminiscent of patriarchal constructions of family (i.e., subservient wife and dominant
husband). In the case of New Normal, Goldie, David and Bryan’s surrogate, is employed
to carry their child. They have an active role in her life as she carries out her duties.
Goldie left her home in Ohio because she caught her husband in bed with another
woman. In search of a new life for her and her daughter, Shania, Goldie moves to Los
Angeles where she then becomes a mother again, this time for a gay couple. Early in the
season, Goldie shares with Bryan and David that she wants to go back to school after
their baby was born to pursue a law degree—a degree they offer to pay for because of her
commitment to them. At one point, David and Bryan move Goldie and Shania into their
guesthouse so that she could be more comfortable, in a nicer neighborhood and house,
than in her apartment, which is in a neighborhood often referred to as undesirable by
other characters. Goldie eventually discovers, however, her true talents as a seamstress
and abandons her desire to become an attorney.
As a character, Goldie is presented as a woman trying to find independence from
men; however, her previous dependence is only replicated in her new home with a gay
couple, who not only control her economically but physically as well. In the fourth
episode, titled “Obama Mama,” Bryan and David not only work to control her vote in the
presidential election, they also work to control her eating habits. In the opening scene of
the episode, the couple surprises Goldie and Shania with a morning visit. When they
arrive Goldie and Shania are eating fast food hamburgers for breakfast.
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Bryan: Goldie, what is in your mouth?
David: Oh, my God, is that fast food?
Bryan: Oh, please tell me you’re bulimic so at least it‘ll come up before it hits our
baby.
David: Or you could eat this healthy, organic food we just got you at the farmers’
market.
Bryan: I had never eaten broccoli before I met David.
Nutrition can be fun!
Goldie: Guys, pregnancy cravings are totally normal, and it’s just so delicious.
David: Yeah, I know, but that delicious burger could cause all kinds of
developmental issues for our baby. See, not a lot of people know this, but
charbroiled meat is a carcinogen proven to affect DNA.
Goldie: Oh, well, I ate like this when I was pregnant with Shania, and she turned
out just fine. Okay?
[She said this as David watches her squeeze ketchup from the bottle into her
mouth]
Goldie’s eating habits and general well-being are often the subject of David’s ridicule. As
a doctor and the biological father of the baby, David assumes many of the traditional
heterosexual masculine partner roles in David and Bryan’s employer-employee
relationship with Goldie.
When read via the dominant code, Hall’s (1986) “preferred reading,” Goldie, a
newly single woman, found reprieve in Los Angeles from an unfaithful husband, a dire
economic situation, and an oppressive social setting. She works to provide a future for
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her and her daughter by opening her mind and allowing the possibility of a new normal.
She is empowered by her own willingness to provide Bryan and David with something
they cannot do on their own and something so far removed from her previous life in
Ohio. She often refers to herself as an independent and strong woman during the season
because of her courageousness to blaze her own path.
Goldie’s plight looks much more bleak in an “oppositional” reading of the
narrative. Goldie finds no independence from the patriarchal structures that have ruled
her life thus far. Her grandmother Jane raised her after her mother and father abandoned
her at a young age. She, like her mother and grandmother, gave birth to a child in her
teens, and married the father in accordance with social pressures that work to contain
women and their sexuality within the confines of marriage and motherhood. Her new life
in Los Angeles mimicked her old life. Instead of a man who objectified her for sexual
purposes, now two men objectify her for reproductive purposes. David and Bryan
infantilize Goldie to ensure their own ends by controlling her diet, housing, livelihood,
and body. She did not transform into an autonomous woman, rather, she transforms into a
new object meant as a means to an end for two new men.
Following the Binary
Many of the episodes of The New Normal and Modern Family, the only two
programs in this study with prominent male-male romantic couples, emphasize relational
story lines without a female identified character; however, those episodes often rely on a
gender binary (masculine-feminine) to tell stories that viewers could easily read via a
dominant code. Many of these episodes rely on the common trope of the infantilized
feminine, where women are treated as children who need to be controlled for their own
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good (Battles & Hilton-Morrow, 2002) in contrast with the dominant masculine
character. The dichotomy generally takes shape via traditional gender roles (i.e., feminine
domestic duties and masculine economic obligations) with the masculine character being
the levelheaded breadwinner inept at performing maternal responsibilities versus the
irrational caretaker with little interest, knowledge or skill in performing masculine roles.
In episode four of Modern Family, “The Butler’s Escape,” and episode ten of New
Normal, “The XY Factor,” the gender binary is used in the absence of a female-identified
character. In the episode of Modern Family, Mitchell and Cam switch roles for the
episode with disastrous consequences, and, in New Normal, Bryan comes to terms with
his role as the “mother” in his future son’s life. First, I will discuss both episodes before
providing a preferred and oppositional reading for each.
Mitchell and Cam’s narrative starts with the first day of Cam’s new job as a
middle school music teacher. In the episode, Cam and Mitchell both adjust to new
household duties in which Cam left for work while Mitchell was left to care for Lily. The
audience is given the background for Cam’s new position near the top of the episode
before seeing a scene where Cam explained for Mitchell how to take care of Lily.
Cam: Okay, Lily’s drop-off time is between 8:45 and 8:50, so you should be fine
to get to work by 9. Here is her checklist for her backpack.
Mitchell: Uh, wow.
Cam: Oh, I have this whole thing planned. Okay, I’m gonna walk in, take off my
jacket, and say, “here comes treble.” Big swing on the first day. Please don‘t tamp
down my enthusiasm.
Mitchell: Okay, what else?
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Cam: Oh! The dimmer came in for the switch, so I want you to call the
electrician, but not Brad. Remember? We had a problem with him last time about
the billing.
Mitchell: He wanted his name above the title?
Cam: Yes, you‘ve done that joke before. So cute. So funny.
Mitchell: What else?
Cam: Oh! Lily needs to get a present for Gio’s birthday party. And don’t be
thrown by the invitation. It is a pirate’s party, not a Pilates party. Now sit. I wanna
talk juice boxes.
Mitchell: Cam. Cam, I know what’s happening here. You’re feeling very anxious
about your first day at work, and you’re focusing that anxiety on my day with
Lily.
Cam: Really? Are you sure I’m not completely confident about my first day
because it’s gonna be a home run, and I am worried about you because you’re
taking on a little bit more of the Lily load? [To Lily] Don’t be scared, sweetie.
Mwah!
Mitchell: She’s not scared! Wh-wh-what are you doing?
Cam: Just call me if you need me.
Mitchell: I won’t!
Cam: And thank you for managing my expectations today. Not necessary.
Mitchell: I saw you practicing a bow last night.
Cam: That was just in fun. You know, I highly doubt some teenagers are gonna
throw rose petals at my feet.
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Mitchell: Yeah.
Cam: But I wouldn’t be surprised if I got slow-clapped out of my first class.
Cam and Mitchell both, as it turns out, were overconfident in their abilities to handle the
new roles. Cam bombs his first day of teaching and Mitchell found himself ill-prepared to
handle the responsibilities of taking Lily to school, grocery shopping, handling the
household repair, and cooking dinner. Mitchell enlists the help of his sister, Claire, to
finish the household tasks before Cam comes home for the evening, giving the illusion
that he is able to handle the new role. At the end of the evening, Cam and Mitchell
discussed their days.
Cam: It was a disaster, Mitchell. They hated me! Not just the kids, the teachers.
They wouldn’t sit with me at lunch. I had to sit alone.
Mitchell: Oh, honey.
Cam: And my sweater... the shop teacher spilled juice on it. He said it was an
accident, but it wasn’t an accident.
Mitchell: It’s okay.
Cam: It’s not okay! I failed miserably. And look at you. You did everything so
perfectly.
Mitchell: Well, yes. And... and... and no. Look, look, I . . . I gotta tell ya. Uh . . .
I’ve just been watching how you’ve done things all these years, and I just
perfected it.
Claire: Oh, please, Mitchell!
Cam: Claire . . .
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Claire: Cam, he was every bit the failure you were. He was late picking up Lily.
She was in with the custodians. The only thing he had less to do with than dinner
was the dimmer. And her hair was in braids because there was gum in it. And . . .
why are we hugging?
Cam: Because I know if he called you for help and heard as many insults as I
know he had to hear, then he had a worse day than me.
Mitchell: Oh, she was horrible, Cam.
Cam: Oh! You know what? It’s gonna get better.
Mitchell: No, I know. We just need some time to settle into these new roles.
Cam: You were right to lower my expectations.
Mitchell: I just wish I had lowered mine.
Similarly, episode ten of New Normal features the characters struggling with their gender
roles in preparation for their new child, whose gender they do not yet know.
In accordance with the dichotomous gender binary, each of the men hopes for the
gender matching the roles they perform. Bryan, the feminine character, makes it known
that he prefers to have a daughter, and David, the masculine character, hopes for a son.
During the episode, Bryan works to prepare the nursery for the newborn, but without a
gender, he finds decorating to be “creatively frustrating.” Near the top of the episode,
Goldie reveals the baby’s assigned gender, male, which causes a mixture of emotions
from David and Bryan. David began to make plans for the anticipated birth of their son—
all involving typical masculine activities like jungle gyms, light saber fights, and PeeWee Football. In fact, to help him prepare a friend invites him to help coach his son’s
football team. During the game, Bryan, feeling left out, forces himself into a coaching
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position because, as he said, “We’re having a boy and I want to participate in his life.”
Bryan’s coaching experiment fails, but he finds his talents lie elsewhere—in the kitchen.
Bryan hosts the post-game pizza party at his and David’s house, which the boys on the
football team enjoy. Bryan begins to understand his role in his son’s life.
David: And you thought you wouldn’t be able to relate to boys.
Bryan: Well, kids will say anything if there’s free pizza.
David: Bryan, look at them. They’re having fun, they’re learning new things. This
is not the work of a man that doesn’t know how to connect to boys. You know,
you don’t have to be scared about not relating to your son just because your dad
didn’t know what to do with a boy like you. You’re already a better dad than he
was. Because you’re trying. Our son is very lucky because he is going to have an
awesome dad.
Bryan and David: [simultaneously] Me.
In a “preferred” reading, both of these episodes demonstrate the normality of
same-sex parenting and relationships. The two couples seemingly worry about what most
“normal” heterosexual parents or parents-to-be might worry about—taking care of their
children and home. The appearance of normal relies here on both partners performing
roles prescribed by the dominant ideology—both the masculine and feminine. One
partner is charged with the nurturing homemaker role while the other performs the
masculine duties of earning money and controlling most household affairs. Much like
most heterosexual or opposite-sex couples experience in day-to-day life. However, an
“oppositional” reading of these two examples reveals an unwavering adherence to
patriarchal codes that subverts the feminine and privileges the masculine.
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In the absence of a female-identified character, the feminine partner takes on the
role of the subverted. The more masculine characters, Mitchell and David, infantilize
Cam, in Modern Family, and Bryan, in The New Normal. Both Cam and Bryan serve the
homemaker function, have to be coddled to fight against their hysteria, and both find
solace in their ability to provide “motherly” functions within their family dynamic. At
different points in both series, Cam and Bryan are referred to as “baby momma” or
“mother.” Butler argues that sexuality is “always constructed within the terms of
discourse and power” and power is “partially” understood in terms of “heterosexual and
phallic cultural conventions” (p. 30). Butler contends that heterosexual, homosexual and
bisexual practices are all understood and presented through a “framework” that is
ultimately an “asymmetrical binary of masculine/feminine” (p. 32). She argues gender
conformity is a “regulatory practice” that makes heterosexuality a compulsory model.
Gender roles then, according to Butler, are regulated through an “exclusionary
apparatus,” which eliminates any other model from the discourse (p. 32). Both Modern
Family and The New Normal miss an opportunity to transgress the compulsory
masculine/feminine dichotomy by presenting blurred gender roles or queered gender
identities, or the opportunity to dispense with engendered notions of identity all together.
Instead, both opt to present a heterosexist, patriarchal construction of gender politics
where women/feminine are subordinates of men/masculine. Both programs, ironically,
adhere to the shows’ titles. Each family represents a repackaged family unit that on the
surface appears to be new or evolved, but actually provides only a modern/normal take
on family by way of reliance on labels from the dominant ideology that work to reaffirm
oppressive gender roles and heterosexist structures.
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Intersection of Race, Gender, and Queer Identity
Finally, a discussion of the intersection of race, gender, and sexual identity is
needed to fully discuss the interplay of both racism and sexism within a broader queer
representation on television. Glee provides the only character, although a minor
character, at the intersection of race, gender, and queer identity. Unique, a black
transgender girl played by cisgender actor Alex Newell, transfers to William McKinley
High School, the fictional school in Glee, during the fourth season. During the season, a
few episodes tackle the issue of Unique’s gender identity, but only in secondary plot
lines. Unique appears sporadically in episodes during the season, but the main story line
centers around her love interest, Ryder Lynn, a member of the school’s football team and
one of the straight boys in the glee club. Unique “catfishes” Ryder throughout the season,
meaning she purposely misleads him via social media to think she is someone else. She
pretends to be a white, blonde high school girl named Katie with a crush on Ryder. The
two communicate via social media and develop an online relationship. When Unique
reveals that she is indeed Katie, the show has its first tangible conversation about gender
identity and, to some degree, race and sexuality, albeit brief:
Unique: Yes, I’m Unique aka Wade, aka Katie, aka Catfish. Marley, I love you,
but you don’t have to cover for me anymore. It started off innocent at first, and
then he started telling me things, and it got way too deep to stop. And you don’t
know how long it’s been since I felt this close to someone without all of this
[pointing to her body] getting in the way. I know you’re probably gonna punch
me in the face, but the truth is, I reached out to you because I liked you. So I got a
picture of a cute blonde to make you like me back. But all the stories, all the
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jokes, the connection that we had, that was all me. And that was all real. I’m sorry
I stayed hidden. I didn’t do it to hurt you. I just I really don’t want to lose what we
have.
Ryder: We don’t have anything. I’m not gonna punch you in the face. But I’m
also not gonna talk to you ever again.
The “preferred” reading of Unique’s crush and subsequent “catfishing” of Ryder offers a
glimpse of the struggles a transgender teen in a mid-American high school may
experience. Not only is Unique dealing with her own gender identity, she is also
struggling with typical teenage sexual development—a story that may appeal to a wider
teen audience who can relate to the story if not directly then indirectly. The plot line also
relies on the audience’s knowledge of popular culture to relay meaning. The social media
phenomenon of “catfishing” was made popular by the MTV reality program and the story
of Notre Dame football star Manti Te’o. Te’o, who in 2013 made national news headlines
after he discovered that a woman he met online and established a long-distance
relationship with did not exist. The audience, in a “preferred” reading, is meant to feel
empathy for Unique and Ryder not through the issues of gender identity and race, but
through the teenage experience of love and rejection. Unique represents the jilted teenage
lover. She is the girl with a crush on a guy who is out of her league—a plot line not
unfamiliar in popular television programs and films. Ryder plays the part of the confused
and angry object of Unique’s affection. Unique’s secret, the “catfishing,” causes a rift
between the two that eliminates any hope of Ryder connecting with Unique or her alter
ego, Katie.
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In an “oppositional” reading of Unique, her position at the intersection of race,
gender, and sexuality, however, problematizes the “preferred” reading. Unique, as Nero
(2005) argues, is an imposter. Her character represents an imposter on several levels.
Nero argues that black men are cast as imposters in television programming, which
disallows them the space to join a broader discussion of sexuality or class. The program’s
creators render Unique an imposter through racial and gender terms. As a black male,
Wade, Unique’s given name, is an imposter. Because Wade is a black male, he cannot be
gay, as Nero argues. Black men are only given space to function as hyper-masculine
characters in a white story. Unique as a transgender woman is an imposter because as one
of the show’s characters claims, “Unique is definitely a guy.” Unique’s gender identity
serves as a subject for a debate during the season with many of cast members referring to
her with feminine pronouns. Other characters refer to her via her assigned name, Wade,
and with masculine pronouns despite her asking for everyone to refer to her as a girl.
Finally, Unique’s race and gender transgression, impersonating a blonde, white girl, a
true object of sexual attraction, represents the ultimate offence as an imposter. In an
attempt to find a space to express her gender identity and sexuality, Unique is forced to
create an alternate persona—one that is allowed sexual attractions to men and allowed to
perform feminine gender roles. Unique symbolically annihilates herself to gain an
artificial visibility within the dominant ideology.
Summary
Overall, the creators of all five programs missed an opportunity to provide
characters who buck normalized gender roles and acknowledge and confront their own
privilege. This chapter suggests that by symbolically annihilating LGBTQ people of color
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and gender minorities while also reinforcing the dominant patriarchy through adherence
to traditional forms of sexism and assigned gender roles, the programs further entrench
heteronormative ideology in to mainstream society.
The gay men in these programs replicate heterosexist norms in that they are white,
they abide by the masculine/feminine binary, they resist acknowledgement of their white,
male privilege, and they objectify women via patriarchal codes further marginalizing
LGBTQ people of color, women, and gender-queer individuals. Bell’s (1992) argument
that “Americans achieve a measure of social stability through their unspoken pact to keep
blacks on the bottom,” (p. 152) rings true in this analysis. Just as groups of immigrants
worked during the early 1900s to climb the rungs of the power ladder by distancing
themselves racially from blacks (Roediger, 1991), activists from the neoliberal gay rights
assimilations movement have worked to present the gay community as reflective of the
dominant culture (Duggan 2003). These programs are a reflection of the racial exclusion
from the broader gay rights movement. In a similar way, the movement has worked to
exclude women, or at least subvert women, in a manner consistent with the white
patriarchy. The two programs with adult same-sex couples in long-term monogamous
abide by the compulsory gender norms, masculine/feminine, in which the masculine is
given preference and dominance over the feminine.
Despite moments in the gay and lesbian rights movement’s history when
members worked toward an ultimate goal of broad social justice, the current movement’s
reliance on co-opted black civil rights rhetoric, colorblind racist assumptions, and
heterosexist gender norms works to further marginalize people falling outside the white
heterosexual male standard. Programs like the ones studied here have the power to make
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those groups and individuals visible. Discussions of the intersection of race, gender, and
sexuality are essential to an overall move toward broader social equality. Fiske (1987)
argues that television cannot be the originator of social change. Fiske (1987) says,
“Social change must have its root in material social existence; but television can be, must
be, part of that change, and its effectivity will either hasten or delay it” (p. 45). The
question then is not can television programs help to spur social change. The question is
can the mainstream gay rights movement in the United States change and effect change in
the dominant culture to make effective social change for all?
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CHAPTER V
RICH AND FABULOUS
And although the assimilationist rhetoric of neoliberalism promises equality for
‘all’, in reality, only gays and lesbians with enough access to capital can imagine
a life integrated within North American capitalist culture. It goes without saying
that ‘all’ actually refers to normative citizen-subjects with a host of rights only
afforded to some (and not all) queers.
— Julie Tilsen & David Nylund (2010, p. 69)
Perhaps now we can at least take comfort in the fact that, advertising tells us, we
can spend our way to happiness through weight-loss programs, skin-care
products, and expensive clothing purchases, and can just be as happy as all the
heterosexuals spending their way into bankruptcy because of their insecurities.
That is progress of a very limited sort.
— Donald E. Hall (2009, p. 45)

Mass media are full of representations of rich gay men. Men with impeccable
material taste, large nicely decorated homes, and insatiable consumerist appetites have
been the central characters in television shows like Will & Grace and Queer Eye for
Straight Guy. These men give home decorating and personal fashion tips to average
Americans on early morning network news programs. Aside from their acute sense of
fashion and taste, most Americans have probably come to equate gay men with larger
than average disposable incomes via media representations. However, Gates (2014)
found in a study of food insecurity among LGBT people that 1-in-4 LGBT people,
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approximately 2.4 million people, experienced “a time in the last year when they did not
have enough money to feed themselves or their family” (p. 1). Gates (2014) also found,
in 2012, 4-in-10 lesbian, gay, and bisexual people aged 18 to 44, who were raising
children, received food stamps. In a separate study released in June 2013, researchers
argued same-sex couples are “more vulnerable to poverty in general than different-sex
married couples” (Badgett, Durso, & Schneebaum, 2013, p. 1). Researchers in the same
study reported African Americans in same-sex couples poverty rates nearly double the
poverty rates of opposite-sex African American couples, and “African American men in
same-sex couples are more than six times more likely to be poor than white men in samesex couples” (p. 3). Despite a growing body of Census and income data that suggest
otherwise, the vision of affluence in the gay community persists in the mainstream.
The Atlantic writer Nathan McDermott tackles the issue in a March 21, 2014,
article where he tracked the myth to the 1990s boom in gay and lesbian marketing. He
argues an array of social issues leads to LGBT poverty including job discrimination,
homelessness, and misinformation. The myth, McDermott (2014) says, has been so often
told that it has become a pervasive element in the social construction of the LGBT
community. He also maintains the influence of popular culture aids in the perpetuation of
the myth of gay affluence:
Popular culture has helped launch gay people in to the mainstream, but for all the
benefits that shows such as Will & Grace, Modern Family, and Glee have had for
the LGBT community on the public’s consciousness, few cultural outlets
accurately represent the realities gays and lesbians face in America today.
Realities like poverty, discrimination, homelessness and food insecurity. And as
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Justice Scalia has shown, this misinformation is more damaging than simple
ignorance. It holds back the entire gay equality movement. (McDermott, 2014
paras. 20-21)
With such compelling evidence as to the plight of many in the LGBTQ community, why
do mass media representations so frequently rely on a vision of affluent gay men? I argue
in the remainder of this chapter that the creation of an affluent gay market not only
provides gay-targeted media outlets with a carrot for advertising revenues, but it also
works to create an attractive, powerful gay community for the mainstream. In the same
way that a heteronormative sexuality and an adherence to dominant racial and gender
norms aids upholding homonormative standards, perpetuating the ideal affluent gay man
or couple normalizes gay identity. In this chapter, I first detail the history of the gay
market segment created to attract national advertisers to gay and lesbian media outlets.
Second, I provide literature on the impact of the creation of a gay market segment on the
broader LGBTQ community, and finally, I provide preferred and oppositional readings of
examples from two of the five shows in this study.
Creating the Gay Market
A strong push to include gay and lesbian-centered market began in the 1990s.
Sender (2004) argues the emergence of this push came on the heels of various advertising
and promotional campaigns aimed at gays and lesbians along with an up-tic in television
programming aimed at gay and lesbian audiences and gay-centered media outlets. She
suggests the upswing meant that gays and lesbians were then “considered a sufficiently
large and profitable group to warrant marketers’ attention, and signal a mature phase of
the gay market” (p. 1). The new concentration on gay and lesbian consumers, however,
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did not necessarily mean a push toward gay rights initiatives. Sender argues, “Marketers
have attempted to establish a commonsense idea that the business of gay marketing can
be considered independently of the politics of gay rights, identity, and visibility . . .” (p.
3). Sender contends, “By separating business from politics, marketers appeal to a liberalutilitarian economic model in which financial decisions can be made free of political
motivations or ramifications, and where marketers can reach new consumers and generate
increased profits independently of any impact this activity might have on social relations
or cultural politics” (p. 3). However, Sender (2004) maintains, this line of argument
disavows the extent to which “all economic activity has political effects” (p. 3), and the
increase in gay visibility as a result of this marketing push has been contested by both
those inside the LGBT community and those opposed to the efforts of LGBTQ activists.
Sender argues that like other market segments and publics, marketers construct
the gay market. In other words, the LGBTQ buying bloc does not essentially exist. Those
trying to sell goods and services call it into being. People who identify as gay are then
made a visible target market. She contends that the gay market is based on two fictions:
“the fiction of market segmentation and the fiction of an essentialized gay identity” (pp.
143-144). She contends that the assumptions and technologies that make market
segmentation possible are “built upon ideological foundations and have political
consequences, not least because they make visible a fictive entity called ‘the gay market’
in a history of cultural invisibility and homophobia” (p. 144). Sender said she found that
many marketers see the ideal gay consumer as male, young, single, and childless: “The
elevated affluence and education levels used to describe the gay market are extrapolated
to a psychographic profile of gays as tasteful, trendsetting, and loyal customers” (p. 146).
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She concludes that this view of the gay market excludes many LGBTQ people from the
marketers’ image of gay. She argues the elusiveness of many LGBTQ identified people
results in gay market researchers limiting their samples to homogenous, nonrepresentative samples. For this reason, she says the bulk of gay market research has
come from middle-class, white gay men. Middle-class, white gay men have historically
been the most visible members of the gay community, she contends, so their ability and
willingness to participate in market research is much greater than others. Generally
speaking, most respondents to LGBTQ-identified marketing surveys are those who are
“protected by wealth or an independent means of income, and whose willingness to
participate is thus influenced by the very factors that market research aims to measure”
(Sender, 2004, p. 148). Sender argues that this is not exclusive to gay marketers
(especially magazine publishers). She said, “All readership surveys tend to exaggerate the
affluence of their subscribers” to attract advertisers to their publication.
Creating a gay market geared at those craving visibility also creates an air of
enthusiasm, which furthers the attractiveness of the gay market to advertisers and
producers. Sender (2004) contends that what may seem to marketers like enthusiasm to
be heard, as a consumer on the part of gay respondents may actually be an enthusiasm for
visibility in general. She argues that many LGBT respondents may complete marketing
questionnaires in a bid for visibility in a world where the opportunities may be limited.
The enthusiasm is then promoted and prolonged as Hall (2009) argues through
consumption. He argues most current gay media outlets like Out magazine promote a
mindset of “happiness-inducing consumerism” (p. 43). This mindset does not promote a
“concrete interest in the future;” it promotes, according to Hall, the “ever-expanding
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entertainment, clothing, and fragrance options” (p. 44). He argues that it only promotes
the ecstasy of consumption. He contends some positives result from market visibility and
from the pleasures of consumption; however, “it is not socially transformative in any
ethically responsible, much less queer or radical, way” (p. 44). He contends, “Perhaps
now we can at least take comfort in the fact that, advertising tells us, we can spend our
way to happiness through weight-loss programs, skin-care products, and expensive
clothing purchases, and can just be as happy as all the heterosexuals spending their way
into bankruptcy because of their insecurities. That is progress of a very limited sort” (p.
45). Tilsen and Nylund (2010) maintain the trend of generalizing the LGBTQ community
for the purpose of demographic information, which will be used to target the community
as consumers, creates an alignment between the LGBTQ community and neoliberalism.
They contend that support for neoliberal causes, as a means for visibility, includes
promoting militarization, privatization of welfare and healthcare, marriage equality, and
conspicuous consumption. Tilsen and Nylund argue, “And although the assimilationist
rhetoric of neoliberalism promises equality for ‘all,’ in reality, only gays and lesbians
with enough access to capital can imagine a life integrated within North American
capitalist culture. It goes without saying that ‘all’ actually refers to normative citizensubjects with a host of rights only afforded to some (and not all) queers” (p. 69).
Assumptions about the Gay Market
Sender (2004) concludes that like all market segments the gay market segment in
constructed with three assumptions in mind: homogeneity, separation, and essence.
According to Sender, the assumption of homogeneity assumes that everyone in a
particular group shares one defining characteristic that “renders all other differences
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within the group unimportant” (p. 154). There are obvious holes in this line of thought
especially when considering gender, race/ethnicity, and class issues that divide the
LGBTQ population into many more groups. Separation assumes that the gay market can
be made discernable from those outside the group. However, in reality, those identifying
as bisexual, transgender, pansexual, two-spirited, polyamorous, etc., challenge this
assumption because they do not share in this single identifier—gay. In an effort to appeal
to a broader base of consumers many marketers began using nomenclature such as the
GLBT or LGBTQ market to show a broader inclusion of constituents. Sender argues that
this is in name only: “in reality bisexuals and transgender people remain largely invisible
both in the routines of market formation and in the image of the gay market these routines
help to produce” (p. 164). Finally, the assumption of essence assumes an essentialized, or
inherent, gay identity, that is definable and knowable. Sender contends those who fall
outside the normalized construction of gay (i.e., lesbians, bisexuals, transgender, LGBTQ
people of color, and poorer LGBTQ people) undermine the essentialized view of
sexuality used in the construction of the gay market segment. She argues that the three
assumptions work to purge all dissenters because they are not attractive to advertisers.
She says that this process does, “violence to those who don’t belong by making them
invisible or laughable, by depriving them of revenues for publications, and by making
their presence less legitimate in the public domain. Yet it also does violence to those who
appear to fit the idealized stereotype of the white, affluent, gay male consumer by
essentializing gayness to a reified fact and thereby negating an expansive view of
sexuality and desire” (pp. 171-172).
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The result of the construction of the gay market segment is a commodified gay
culture that has been stripped of many of the people who helped to develop various
aspects and subcultures within the community. This whitewashing of the culture excludes
many LGBTQ people, which creates a more attractive package of consumers for
advertisers and goods producers. The construction of the gay market also serves to further
assimilate the dominant gay culture into the dominant heterosexual culture—a culture
that privileges whiteness, wealth, masculinity, and marital status. The gay liberation
movement then, over time, has been diminished from a movement striving to overturn the
dominant power structure to a non-movement concerned with equality through sameness
and privileged visibility, further marginalizing those who do not fit the market ideal. In
the remainder of this chapter, I will provide oppositional readings of examples from
Modern Family and New Normal that exemplify the power of the illusion of the gay
market segment and its prevalence in mass media. Both examples, work from the
dominant ideological notion that gay men not only possess the means to consume but that
they represent a powerful buying bloc that influences other buyers and could potentially
cure the economic ills of the country.
“They Come to Play”
Examples of the gay market segment and identity via consumption are ample in
all five programs studied; however, most are so seamlessly weaved into the fabric of the
shows that gay consumption, affluence, and market presence are seldom the sole subject
of large chunks of discussion. For example, all but one of the gay characters in the five
shows are either employed in high paying occupations or are at least partnered with a
person with such a job. The one exception to the gainfully employed trend is Max from
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Happy Endings, who despite his underemployment is not shown in financially dire
conditions. The characters, whose homes are part of the set, all live in large houses that
are nicely decorated. Their tastes in clothing, décor, and food are often exhibited or are
desired or sought out by others. The gay characters in Glee, Modern Family, and New
Normal often buy trips, clothing, food, houses, and other material goods without financial
consequence. The characters often acknowledge their own financial wealth or material
consumption as a badge of honor, and, in many cases, are charged with the task of
throwing opulent parties or redecorating someone’s home or both.
The creators and writers of Modern Family exemplify the power of the assumed
gay buying bloc in the culmination of a three-episode story arc that tracks the progress of
Mitchell and Cam, Claire, and Phil’s, Mitchell’s sister and brother-in-law, house flip
(buying a house, remodeling, and reselling at a profit). On a denotative level, the house
flip draws on the popularity of house flipping as an investment strategy. The process of
house flipping is the subject of several programs outside the sitcom genre, on do-ityourself networks and programs. Thus, the audience is well aware of the time, money,
and work most house flips require. The audience is also most likely aware of the financial
gamble associated with house flipping. If the house sells at a high enough price, the
flippers not only recoup the money spent to buy the house but they are rewarded with a
profit. The story storyline culminates with what is essentially the reveal episode, in
keeping with the do-it-yourself genre. In episode 20, “Flip Flop,” not only does the
audience see the finished house, or at least a portion of the finished house, but the payoff
is revealed as well. During the episode, Phil, who is a real estate agent, haggles with his
business rival Gil Thorpe, who attempts to buy the house way below the asking price.
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Just as the group comes to terms with taking a loss on the house flip, Gil ups his offer to
compete with the “gays.”
The scene begins with Mitchell, Cam, Claire, and Phil viewing the house with
another prospective buyer, who does not buy, when Gil arrives to inspect the house.
Because Gil does not know the relationship between Phil and Mitchell and Cam, the two
impersonate to be perspective buyers.
Gil: Hey, Dunphy.
Phil: Gil.
Gil: Your office said you’d be over here.
Phil: Yeah, I am here. With my buyers. What do you guys think?
Mitchell: Oh, my God! This house is perfect.
Cam: I especially love the warm embrace of the parlor!
Mitchell: It screams you.
Cam: No, it screams you, sweetie.
Mitchell: Oh, dis doggie door, Cam. Look.
Cam: Awww!
Gil: Damn it. Gays. They come to play.
Phil: I’m busy, Gil.
Gil: Don’t accept any offers without talking to me first. My buyer wants in, all
right?
Phil: I don’t know. We’re pretty far down that road.
Gil: All right. We’ll up the offer.
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Phil: Gil Let me tell you how this is gonna go down. First, you’re gonna buy me a
lovely dinner. [A reference to something Gil told Phil earlier in the episode about
what was going to happen when Phil sold the house to Gil’s buyer]
No, that’s not it. First, I’m gonna buy you a lovely dinner. Then I’m gonna take
you in the back . . .
Cam: It’s gonna happen! It’s gonna happen!
Claire: We’re gonna sell the house.
Cam: You see, Mitchell? I told you so.
A “preferred” reading of this scene relies on the dominant assumption of a powerful gay
buying bloc, which in this case prevents the main characters from losing money on a real
estate investment. The overall message of Gil’s assertion that the gays “come to play” is
that when gay men want a material good they get material goods and will most likely stop
at nothing to get it. Through this narrative of power, gay men gain visibility not only as
consumers but as powerful consumers, meaning they have the disposable income and
bargaining power to wreak havoc on their competition. Secondly, the power of gay men
as trendsetters is prevalent in this scene. If the gays want it then it must be worth having
because gay men are assumed to have an eye for material goods. Phil understands this
power, which is why he introduced Cam and Mitchell as his buyers, and Cam and
Mitchell understand this power, which is why they begin to point out the features of the
house. Overall, the “preferred” reading presents a positive view of the power gay men
have in the market, which garners visibility and credibility outside the market.
A “negotiated” reading of the scene, however, hones in on the assumptions made
in the construction of the gay market segment. This scene perpetuates what Sender (2004)
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argues are the assumptions of the gay market segment: homogeneity, separation, and
essence. An amalgamation of the three assumptions is seen in this scene. Gil’s
assessment of the “gays” as a group who comes to play offers a homogenized view of the
gay community, one that assumes all gay men have the means and drive to make big
purchases in a competitive way. The assertion also depicts the separation of the gay
market from other markets. In this case, the separate gay market is a desirable market for
Phil, who is trying to earn the maximum amount of money on an investment. The buyers
were not a straight couple, and if they had been, the outcome would have been different.
The buyers were, in fact, a desired market segment—they were gay men. Finally, the
essentialized gay eye for consumable goods transforms Mitchell and Cam into a
commodity. Mitchell and Cam are hot commodities. As trendsetters and trend seekers,
knowing what they like, what they want, and how much they will pay for it is valuable to
those selling goods to everyone.
A “negotiated” reading, however, does not completely deconstruct the scene for a
new understanding of the power of the gay market segment assumptions. The most
striking thing about an “oppositional” reading of this scene is the invisibility of an
alternative or a transgression of the assumptions. As previously stated, the three
assumptions of the gay market segment are so permanently ingrained in the dominant
ideology of the gay community that contesting those notions would be futile. The gay
men in the scene, Mitchell and Cam, are only given power via buying power. Without
their ability to present as members of the gay buying bloc or as commodified trendsetters,
they have no standing with the straight characters in the scene. Thus, those LGBTQ
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people without the cultural or economic capital to compete and comply with the overall
desirable gay market are rendered invisible and powerless.
This scene provides an example of the established power of the gay buying bloc,
Gil knew the gays “come to play;” however, an example from New Normal provides
insight in to what could be even more power in the form of same-sex marriages and
wedding ceremonies. In Chapter III, I examined episode six of New Normal as an
example of the presentation of same-sex marriage as logical development for same-sex
couples. In this chapter, the episode is examined for it adherence to the narrative of gay
affluence and the potential of gay affluence to provide a national economic boost. During
the episode, Bryan takes on the duty of planning Shania’s “pretend” wedding to her
classmate. As Bryan’s plans take shape, an expensive nuptial extravaganza emerges with
a customized dinner menu, a handmade dress, high-end invitations, and a celebrity guest
list. Bryan’s planning seems to get more and more elaborate as the episode moves along.
He enlists the help of his work assistant, Rocky, played by NeNe Leakes, to plan the
wedding. Byran’s planning begins soon after Shania makes the wedding announcement in
scene near the top of the episode.
Bryan: Ooh.
Goldie, Shania, and Rocky: Ooh.
Byran: Hamachi tartare on crisped wonton, chipotle marinated flank steak, and
my favorite, the lamb slider. Now, the lamb might get a little breathy, but we can
have a mint amuse bouche on hand if need be.
Rocky: Got it. My dad can’t afford a new leg.
Goldie: These all look so foreign. Were you up all night making them, Rocky?
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Rocky: No, but I was up all night hating my life.
Bryan: Okay, so I’ve ordered the gardenias, I sent out the invitations. Now,
Goldie, where are we with the dress?
Goldie: Uh, I think I’ll just make her something myself.
Bryan: [to Rocky who is keeping notes of his orders] Okay, so we’re gonna need
a dress.
David: What’s going on?
Shania: We’re planning my wedding.
David: I thought it was a pretend wedding.
Goldie: It is, but it‘s a real pretend wedding.
Bryan: Duh, David.
Rocky: You take that crazy Baton. I am going to go have a drink.
David: Bryan . . .
Bryan: mmm-hmm?
David: Can I talk to you for a second?
Bryan: Yes. [to Goldie and Shania] Let me know if that’s too chewy.
David: A wedding? A real wedding? With flowers and food and a dress? I’m
surprised you didn‘t hire a monkey to be the ring bearer.
Bryan: I tried, but the only one in town is booked on some TV show.
David: Bryan, Shania is a nine-year-old girl with a crush. If she wanted a fantasy
playground wedding. I get it. But not everybody wants what you want. This is
becoming the social event of the season.
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Bryan: Oh, from your lips. Question. Do the Kardashians have any school-age
children?
A “preferred” reading of Bryan’s wedding planner role relies on the comedic nature of
his over-the-top planning of Shania’s “pretend” child wedding. The audience, knowing
the role of gay men as purveyors of taste and material consumption, understand the joke
and can appreciate the analogy to a “real” gay wedding because of the assumption that
gay weddings are the “social event of the season.” Bryan’s overboard planning is set
against a backdrop of absurdity, which nearly every other character in the episode
acknowledges. Rocky’s well-timed jabs allude to the amount of money being spent on the
event and time being wasted on the planning, and David’s outright protest of the
extravagant planning mimics arguments made about same-sex marriage and the possible
repercussion for ostentatious displays of unconventional relationships. In the end,
however, Bryan’s wedding planning is viewed as the ultimate romantic gesture. He
receives praise for his food choices and the atmosphere he creates. Bryan uses his essence
as a gay man—good taste, large budget, and command of trends—to plan the event. In
the end, the audience is provided an example of the extravagant, romantic weddings that
could be if marriage equality is written in to law. They are also invited to imagine the
economic boon that would occur if gay men everywhere began to host these types of
weddings.
However, what happens when gay men in actuality don’t throw weddings like
this? What about queer individuals and groups who will not participate in same-sex
weddings? The preferred reading presupposes that gay marriages will not only provide
equal rights to people seeking the same thing as their heterosexual counterparts—the
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logical next step—but also will provide gay men an arena to flaunt their affluence. The
notion that gay weddings will be grand spectacles of romantic love relies on
homonormative assumptions about relationships and economics. This standard not only
excludes LGBTQ people who do not subscribe to the institution of marriage or who are
denied the privilege via racism and patriarchy, but it also excludes LGBTQ without the
means to produce grand wedding ceremonies replete with exotic foods, one-of-a-kind
couture, and seemingly endless budgets—or at the very least wedding ceremonies that do
not mimic the opposite-sex model.
Summary
The “preferred” reading of the discourse regarding the assumption of gay
affluence in these programs can be explained by Fiske’s (1987) arguments that television
works to promote meaning that supports the dominant ideology. That system of meaning
operates to “naturalize those meanings into common sense” (p. 14). By presenting gay
affluence as natural or common sense, the programs’ creators and writers do not have to
approach the subject as bluntly as the issue of gay marriage or gay parenting, which may
not yet be naturalized in the dominant ideology. However, adherence to the narrative of
gay affluence is much more positive than issues of race, gender, non-normative sexual
desire, and poverty, which are all symbolically annihilated via the programs studied. The
avoidance of these issues is not only an issue of television programming involving gay
men—it is seen across the programing spectrum. I argue that these issues lie so far
outside the heteronormative (white, heterosexual, male middle-class) conception of the
world that being confronted with issues most likely deemed radical by the mainstream
would cause too much dissonance to retain an audience. However, the dangers of
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perpetuating a homonormative conceptualization of all LGBTQ people only works to
further marginalize those falling outside the dominant prescribed, acceptable gay
model—white, male, monogamous, and middle-class. In many ways, this chapter
accounts for the issues discussed in the previous chapters. As the gay rights movement
has become increasingly more marketable, via the narrative of gay affluence, the more
traction the homonormative model seems to gain. Probably more now than ever before in
the gay rights movement adherence to the homonormative is essential because of the shift
in the last couple of decades to a new model of assimilation.
If queer persons of color or queer gender minorities cannot appeal to the
producers of consumables, how do they make themselves visible to the majority? If queer
people are more likely to be at or below poverty levels than their straight counterparts,
but the only representations in the media depict a different story, then how do they
become visible? The answer to both questions is that they do not become visible—they
remain hidden in the shadows as not to negatively affect the movement toward marriage
equality or same-sex parenting rights. The constructed gay market segment with
assumptions of homogeneity, separation, and essence work to maintain this segregation
of queer individuals and groups. By assuming all gay people think, live, buy, consume,
earn, and feel alike, marketers, often times gay men and lesbians, purge those who think,
live, buy, consume, earn, and feel differently from the ranks of the gay community. Being
purged from the community via an inability to wield great purchasing power, queer
people who fall outside the constructed marketing segment essentially fall outside the
push for civil rights and privileges associated with the gay and lesbian movement.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
One of the pleasures of working on a project like this is answering questions
about your work and the subject of the study. People generally perk up when I mention I
get to watch television and call it research. Nearly everyone has his or her favorite
Mitchell and Cam story from Modern Family, or she or he may want to know if I like to
watch the programs too. In general, people talk about how great the shows are for giving
America a glimpse at gay couples and their families. Some mention the scarcity of such
characters in the history of television, while others laud the programs for doing well and
maintaining a following. Some ask me what I think of the programs from a researcher’s
standpoint. I generally give them either a short concise answer of “well there are issues,”
or I begin a 10 to 15 minute lecture that begins with, “It is what they do not talk about
that is the issue.”
The responses I get to my critiques are interesting, and they are why I think this
research is so important. There is the assumption that because Mitchell and Cam, Bryan
and David, Kurt and Blaine, and Max are funny, well liked, successful, happy, and on
primetime network television, their presence in popular culture must be a step in the right
direction. Many have said these characters give people with no connection to the LGBTQ
community a connection, which they argue helps to turn the tide of public opinion.
Giving these characters that power, the power to influence public opinion or to educate
the mainstream on LGBTQ culture, is hostile. It is hostile to the many individuals and
groups who fall outside the realm of the white, middle-class, monogamous, gay male
world. What happens when they meet someone in real life that does not look like Cam
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and Mitchell or David and Bryan? Who is eliminated from this sitcom simulation of the
LGBTQ community?
This study offers a critique of these programs and examines the invisibility of
many members of the LGBTQ community that are symbolically annihilated for their nonnormative sexual desires or relationships, racial or gender identities, or low socioeconomic status. By presenting an LGBTQ community void of the “L,” “B,” “T,” or “Q”
or by avoiding representations of people at the intersections of LGBTQ and race,
ethnicity, gender, and class, television producers deliver to television audiences
characters who represent dominant heteronormative subjects with which to relate. Those
audiences then deliver advertisers to the program producers via a palatable gay subject.
Other cultural factors such as racism, heterosexism, sexism, and classism also play a role
in the decision-making processes. By eliminating anyone outside the norm from the
discourse, the norm remains intact without upsetting the status quo.
When television programs shame queer sexual practice or eliminate
representations of people who do not subscribe to the homonormative conceptualization
of romantic love from the discourse, a swath of queer individuals and queer causes are
also eliminated from the discourse. Shaming serves to stifle queer sexuality, which may
work to transgress heteronormative relational dynamics like monogamy, coupling, and
private sex. In essence, the current narrative works to avoid the media representations of
homosexuals in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s when men who had sex with men were
depicted as sexual deviants, and generally, only made it to the media via police reports of
vice activity or crime reports of child molestation charges. Further, the media coverage of
the 1980s outbreak of the AIDS epidemic also focused heavily on the sexual practices of
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gay men, practices deemed to have deadly consequences for a population that seemed,
via media reports, to put sexual gratification before public health. By contrast, the
representations examined in this study are nearly always void of non-normative sexual
practices, and the discussion of sex stayed true to the heteronormative model:
monogamous, committed relationships between partnered gay men. Because of this
resemblance to straight coupling, marriage is given credence over all other gay and
lesbian civil rights and privileges.
Marriage is then depicted as the measuring stick by which the gay rights
movement is measured—it is part of the natural evolution of the movement. However,
that assumption is dangerous, especially to those excluded from this image. Feminist
scholars have long seen marriage as a white, patriarchal institution working to subvert
women and grant privilege to men. In this same way, gay marriage works to subvert
LGBTQ people of color, those with non-normative gender expressions, LGBTQ people
living below poverty level, and those with non-normative sexual desires. So what
happens when same-sex marriage is codified in all 50 states? Does the gay rights
movement end? I argue that such a stout emphasis on marriage does not provide wider
social justice to LGBTQ people—especially those excluded in the discourse created by
these programs.
Another troubling critique of the programs in this study was the avoidance of
issues of race and gender. Consistent with previous research the programs studied
presented a discourse that excused gay men from racism and sexism because of a shared
minority status. By symbolically annihilating LGBTQ people of color and gender
minorities while also reinforcing the dominant patriarchy through adherence to traditional
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forms of sexism and assigned gender roles, the five programs further entrench
heteronormative ideology into mainstream society. The gay men in these programs
replicate heterosexist norms in that they are white, they abide by the masculine/feminine
binary, they resist acknowledgement of their white, male privilege, and they objectify
women via patriarchal codes, thereby further marginalizing LGBTQ people of color,
women, and gender-queer individuals. More troubling is the notion that because gay men
claim an ethnic-model minority status with people of color and women they can operate
as stand ins for those groups within the discourse. By this logic, LGBTQ people of color
or gender minorities do not have to be visible because their plight is the same as that of
white gay men.
Finally, an adherence to a narrative of gay affluence eliminates even more people
from LGBTQ discourse. People without the means to buy and spend and wield
purchasing power are not represented in the programs. The dangers of perpetuating a
homonormative conceptualization of all LGBTQ people only works to further
marginalize those falling outside the dominant prescribed, acceptable gay model—white,
male, monogamous, and middle-class. Pride festivals and parades across the country
began in the 1970s to provide an opportunity for queer people to publicly acknowledge
their differences from the mainstream. The early movement longed for a total
reevaluation of the sexual norms in the United States, which they sought via a discourse
of difference; however, as the 1970s gave way to the 1980s and 90s, pride events and the
gay rights movement became ever more marketable entities with obligations not only to
the gay community but also to the corporate sponsors and advertisers footing the bill. The
characters in these programs represent years of perfecting the product of gay rights.
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This study provides my interpretation of the programs studied, which is only one
of possibly hundreds of ways to interpret the programming. I approach these readings
from a privileged perspective. I am white. I grew up in rural Mississippi in a lower-tomiddle class home with two parents. I have completed graduate education. I am a
cisgender gay man in a committed monogamous relationship. My privilege as someone
who fits the hetero and homonormative construction of “proper” gay man prevents me
from feeling the full effects of symbolic annihilation. I can see myself or, at least,
someone who closely resembles me on television. I do not purport to completely
understand the damaging effects of exclusion from the dominant discourse of gay rights.
However, through awareness of my privileged position, I acknowledge that without a
broader discourse of social justice that considers intersections of sexuality, race,
ethnicity, gender, and class, the white patriarchy will not only persist but will gain
strength.
Television is not the only media ripe for this type of analysis. The sports media
industry, for example, is an interesting site for such research. The 2014 coming out of
former University of Missouri football star Michael Sam and the media event that
followed provide an excellent opportunity to discuss the discourse surrounding sexuality,
race, and professional sports. The coverage often includes similar notions as discussed in
previous sections of this paper—ethnic minority status, normalized sexual attraction and
practices, racialized masculinities, and adherence to privileging heteronormative notions
of gender and power. The news media in general is also understudied in this vein of
research and may also provide yet another mode of cultural production that contributes to
an overall normalized version of LGBTQ identity and the further marginalization of those
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who fall outside the dominant notion of normal. Coverage of national issues like LGBTQ
teen suicides and hate crimes, the Chik-fil-A boycott and response actions by LGBTQ
activists, and the social justice issues like marriage equality, equal protection laws, equal
pay laws, or sodomy laws, would give additional insight in to the maintenance of
heteronormative ideology in the United States.
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